



In the ﬁnal days of campaigning for the Japanese Upper House elec-
tion in July 2013, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō visited Japan’s southern-
most islands of Okinawa Prefecture. His conservative party was in 
trouble there because of a long-standing political dispute over a U.S. 
military airﬁeld. Yet Abe did not go to champion the U.S.-Japan alli-
ance; instead he went to the outlying islands of Ishigaki and Miyako, 
the ﬁrst visit there by a Japanese prime minister in forty-eight years. 
In these last hours of a deﬁnitive election, Abe chose to praise the 
Japan Coast Guard and Air Self-Defense Forces for defending their 
nation against China.
Tensions between Japan and China had been brewing for years, 
but the territorial dispute over isolated islands in the East China Sea 
prompted particularly strong emotions in Japan. Indeed, when he 
returned to the prime minister’s oﬃce in December 2012, Abe inher-
ited an escalating crisis that seemed headed for a possible armed clash 
over the disputed Senkaku Islands. Chinese and Japanese leaders had 
set aside this territorial dispute during the ﬁnal phase of negotiations 
for the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and had worked together 
ever since to keep this issue oﬀ their diplomatic agenda. But a Chinese 
ﬁshing trawler captain changed that in September 2010 when he delib-
erately rammed two Japan Coast Guard ships near the islands, prompt-
ing his arrest by the Japanese government. The Chinese and Japanese 
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governments were at loggerheads for weeks afterward, with Beijing 
raising diplomatic pressure on Tokyo until it released the captain.
The domestic repercussions in Japan continued, however. A little 
more than a year later, Ishihara Shintarō, the erratic governor of 
Tokyo, announced that he would purchase these islands from their 
owner because the national government was incapable of defending 
their sovereignty against China. The Noda Yoshihiko cabinet moved 
to complete the national government’s purchase of the Senkakus in an 
eﬀort to prevent Governor Ishihara from further inﬂaming the dis-
pute with Beijing. But it was too late. Beijing no longer was interested 
in returning to a quiet management of their diﬀerences. The Chinese 
reaction to Noda’s purchase of the islands was swift and severe. Dem-
onstrations erupted throughout the country, with widespread dam-
age to Japanese companies, and the Chinese government introduced 
its own ships to the islands’ waters to assert its sovereign control.
The diplomatic crises with Beijing over the islands stirred those 
in Japan who had long thought that their postwar security choices 
had left their country vulnerable. Japanese politicians vied with 
one another in their calls for defending Japanese sovereignty over 
the islands. After the purchase of the islands, Abe campaigned for 
the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), advocat-
ing that government oﬃcials be stationed on the islands to assert 
Japan’s “eﬀective control” (jikkō shihai) in the face of the Chinese 
sovereignty challenge. By the time Abe’s conservatives won a land-
slide victory in the Lower House on December 16, 2012, Senkaku 
nationalism was no longer a marginal cause in Japanese politics; the 
defense of Japanese sovereignty over the islands was now the rally-
ing cry of Japan’s ruling party.
The escalating tensions between Japan and China quickly raised 
regional concerns when their two militaries were added to the mix. 
In December 2012, a small Chinese surveillance aircraft entered Japa-
nese airspace over the disputed Senkakus, initially undetected by 
air defense radar. Japanese ﬁghter jets scrambled, leading the new 
LDP government to review its rules of engagement (ROEs) for air 
defenses. Subsequently, Chinese ﬁghter jets were added to the mix of 
surveillance ﬂights near the islands, and new competition for airspace 
was added to the maritime tensions. A month later, as 2013 began, a 
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Chinese naval vessel locked its ﬁre-control radar on a Japanese Mari-
time Self-Defense Force frigate. After the Japanese government made 
this incident public, the Chinese government began investigating the 
incident, and while the Ministry of Defense denied that it had even 
taken place, it did acknowledge that these kinds of military interac-
tions were dangerous and could lead to war. The following fall, how-
ever, a new Chinese announcement provoked concerns about rising 
military tensions yet again. China stated that it was imposing an air 
defense identiﬁcation zone (ADIZ) across the East China Sea, and the 
Ministry of Defense called on all aircraft crossing this area to report 
their intentions to Beijing in advance. Included in the ADIZ were the 
disputed islands.
This escalating territorial dispute drew global attention to the 
deepening rift between Tokyo and Beijing. No longer able to negoti-
ate their diﬀerences, the leaders of China and Japan turned to others 
around the world for support. At the United Nations General Assem-
bly in September 2012, Japanese and Chinese leaders vented their 
frustration—and argued for their interpretation of the dispute. Prime 
Minister Noda articulated his country’s respect for the Charter of the 
United Nations, which calls on nations to “settle disputes in a peace-
ful manner based on international law.” In contrast, China’s foreign 
minister, Yang Jiechi, concluded his speech asserting Chinese sover-
eignty over the Diaoyus by contending that Japan’s national purchase 
of the islands was an “outright denial of the outcomes of the victory of 
the world anti-fascist war and poses a grave challenge to the postwar 
international order.” According to Yang, Japan “stole” these islands 
from China. Uninhabited, rocky islands far from the shores of either 
country thus became the emblem of contest over national identity and 
global inﬂuence. By the end of 2013, Chinese ambassadors in London 
and Washington, D.C., were writing op-eds condemning Japan as a 
“revisionist” power with deep “militarist” values. Japan’s ambassadors 
also took up their pens in an eﬀort to dispute Chinese claims.
Tokyo and Beijing, too, sought to shape Washington’s reaction to 
their dispute. Tokyo turned to its alliance partner to help deter and 
dissuade further coercive action by Beijing, and Beijing cautioned 
Washington to remain neutral. As the confrontation in the East China 
Sea escalated dangerously, the Obama administration strongly urged 
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both Japan and China to remain calm and to pursue a peaceful reso-
lution of their diﬀerences. In October 2010, after Japan and China had 
their ﬁrst round of confrontation over the Chinese ﬁshing trawler 
incident, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton reasserted the 
U.S. position that the Senkaku Islands were covered by article 5 of 
the bilateral U.S.-Japan security treaty. Then when the tensions 
escalated dramatically in September 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon 
Panetta traveled to Asia to reiterate the U.S. defense commitment but 
also to urge restraint by both governments. Even Congress weighed 
in with a joint resolution on the U.S. interests in the dispute. Fear 
of miscalculation—and an inadvertent clash between Asia’s two larg-
est powers—pushed Washington to urge calm and restraint while 
also bolstering Japan’s southern air defenses to enhance deterrence. 
In December 2013, Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Northeast 
Asia to try to dampen China’s ADIZ ambitions and to reassert the 
U.S. position that it would not change its own military operations in 
response. But Tokyo remained skeptical of Washington’s support in 
its contest with Beijing.
SINO-JAPANESE TENSIONS
Territorial nationalism is a potent force in domestic politics, and the 
Japan-China clash over the disputed Senkaku Islands ushered in a 
particularly dangerous moment in their relationship. Japan’s tensions 
in its relationship with China did not begin with the island dispute, 
however, as their diﬃculties in resolving policy diﬀerences had ﬁrst 
become evident a decade earlier. Although not all aspects of the 
complex Sino-Japanese relationship have been contentious, political 
leaders in Japan have found compromise more and more diﬃcult as 
popular enthusiasm for China has faltered. Chinese leaders, too, have 
seemed unable to fulﬁll agreements or to reach a compromise.
Many factors have contributed to the tensions between Tokyo and 
Beijing. For more than a decade, the rise in China’s economic inﬂu-
ence, coupled with the expansion of its military power, signaled a 
potentially signiﬁcant transition of geopolitical power. The anticipa-
tion of a much stronger China, possibly hostile to Japan, increasingly 
fed Japanese perceptions of their relationship with Beijing. China’s 
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neighbors in Asia, particularly U.S. allies, face many challenges in 
confronting this rising power. Greater proximity, economic depen-
dency, and a new emerging regional balance of power create com-
peting choices. Japan’s diﬃculties with China suggest the need for a 
better analysis of these competing inﬂuences, and Tokyo’s experience 
oﬀers a critical case study of the adjustments required of a status quo 
power.
Another important factor is the continued diﬀerences over the 
legacy of the past and the terms of Japan’s postwar settlement. The 
San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed in 1951 and restoring Japanese 
sovereignty in the wake of the United States’ seven-year occupation, 
did not include Japan’s two “rising” neighbors, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In 1950, although 
the Korean War divided the peninsula, a full-ﬂedged government 
had yet to be formed in the ROK. In addition, the United States 
recognized the Kuomintang (Guomindang) government of Chiang 
Kai-shek, and when Beijing fell to the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) in 1949, the United States and its soon-to-be Cold War ally 
in Tokyo refused to recognize the newly formed mainland govern-
ment. It took decades for Japan to conclude separate peace treaties 
with its neighbors. The Japan-ROK Treaty on Basic Relations was 
not concluded until 1965, and the Japan-PRC Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship was not negotiated until after President Richard Nixon’s 
historic trip to China in 1978. Territorial disputes and other issues 
related to the postwar settlement were subject to contemporary revi-
sionist politics in all three Northeast Asian nations, and unresolved 
diﬀerences over history and compensation became lightning rods 
for nationalist sentiment.
The emergence of China as a regional and global power only 
exacerbated the dissatisfaction with the terms of the postwar peace 
between Japan and its neighbors. Then in 2012, intensifying diﬃcul-
ties with Seoul and Beijing over island disputes reinforced the idea 
that Tokyo’s strategic position in Northeast Asia was deteriorating. 
In 2014, Japan’s territorial disputes over islands with three of its 
Northeast Asian neighbors—Russia, South Korea, and China—still 
remained unresolved. The changing Northeast Asian balance of 
power was gradually creating unease over Tokyo’s defenses.
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Finally, tensions over the island dispute gave new urgency to 
Japan’s debate over military reform, and soon after taking oﬃce, the 
Abe cabinet announced that it would review the previous govern-
ment’s national defense plan. For more than a decade, Japan’s military 
budget had not grown, and adjustments to the changing balance of 
forces in the region had been put oﬀ. Equally important, the United 
States and Japan had not undertaken a strategic review of their alli-
ance since 1997 and still were focused on implementing a post–Cold 
War realignment of forces. Much had changed in the region since 
then. Long an advocate of reinterpreting Japan’s constitution to lift 
some of the constraints on Japan’s military, Abe appointed an advi-
sory committee to review the legal basis for expanding Japan’s right 
to the use of force in cooperation with other nations, including the 
United States, and he proposed an increase in Japan’s defense spend-
ing. In New York in September 2013, Abe conﬁrmed to an American 
audience that Japan would not be the “weak link in the regional and 
global security framework where the U.S. plays a leading role,” yet he 
had his eyes on China:
We have an immediate neighbor whose military expenditure 
is at least twice as large as Japan’s and second only to the U.S. 
defense budget. The country has increased its military expendi-
tures, hardly transparent, by more than 10 percent annually for 
more than 20 years since 1989. And then my government has 
increased its defense budget only by zero point eight per cent. 
So call me, if you want, a right-wing militarist.
Abe’s reference to Chinese criticism of his agenda reﬂected Beijing’s 
insistence that he was the problem.
While Abe’s views on Japan’s defense and its postwar history have 
never been in doubt, the acrimony between Tokyo and Beijing has 
become more and more personal. Beijing has not always been criti-
cal of Abe, however. As the newly elected prime minister in the fall 
of 2006, he was openly welcomed in Seoul and Beijing as the states-
man who would repair strained relations and open the way for a 
“mutually beneﬁcial” relationship. Nonetheless, when he returned to 
power in 2012, the Japan-China relationship had already deteriorated 
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considerably. Abe did not create these tensions, though, and in fact, 
he called for high-level talks again with the new Xi Jinping leadership 
in Beijing. But his diplomatic success in his ﬁrst term in oﬃce did not 
translate into success in his second term.
A Decade of Diplomatic Strain
Signs of a changing bilateral relationship already were evident at 
the turn of the century. Over the next decade, repeated frictions 
between Tokyo and Beijing on a variety of policy problems reﬂected 
the growing popular concern over China’s inﬂuence, and the diplo-
matic relationship swung from confrontation to reconciliation and 
back again.
With each problem, the Japanese government seemed increasingly 
unable to resolve its diﬀerences with Beijing. Prime Minister Koi-
zumi Jun’ichirō (2001–2006) presided over roughly half the decade 
of strain between Tokyo and Japan, and for a time, Beijing attributed 
many of these diﬃculties to him. Moreover, Koizumi’s insistence on 
visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine was seen as the primary 
cause of China’s criticism of Japan. When Koizumi stepped down, 
diplomats in Beijing and Tokyo unveiled a sophisticated diplomatic 
blueprint of high-level summitry designed to thaw the chill of the 
Koizumi years, and it was Abe who led the Japanese eﬀort to repair 
relations. The culmination in May 2008 was Hu Jintao’s visit to Japan, 
the ﬁrst in a decade by a Chinese president. Prime Minister Fukuda 
Yasuo, son of the prime minister who had welcomed Deng Xiaop-
ing on his ﬁrst visit to Tokyo in 1978, welcomed Hu and proudly 
announced their new vision for “mutually beneﬁcial relations based 
on common strategic interests.”
But this high-level diplomacy did not end the diﬃculties in the 
Japan-China relationship. New issues drew public criticism. Even after 
the Hu-Fukuda summit in 2008, the two governments continued to 
struggle to manage Japanese fears over poisoned frozen dumplings 
imported from China. Consumers boycotted Chinese goods, and the 
criminal investigation of the incident resulted in tense recrimina-
tions from both governments. In 2010, a Chinese ﬁshing trawler in 
waters near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands created the worst 
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diplomatic standoﬀ between Tokyo and Beijing since normalization. 
Popular animosity in both countries ratcheted upward as their politi-
cal leaders feuded openly. After the two-week confrontation ended 
and tempers cooled, diplomats began yet again to return to the diplo-
macy of reconciliation, but with little progress. Again in 2012 the 
two countries were at odds over their island dispute. In mid-August, 
Chinese activists landed on the Senkakus; the Noda cabinet followed 
through on its purchase of the islands from their owner; and wide-
spread anti-Japanese demonstrations followed in China. Compared 
with the ﬁshing trawler incident, tensions between Beijing and Tokyo 
escalated dangerously as popular antagonisms soared, and even the 
two militaries became engaged. The carefully orchestrated diplomatic 
eﬀort to steady the Japan-China relationship had failed.
At home, the Japanese were struggling to ﬁnd a new approach to 
governance, and this aﬀected their diplomacy with China as well. 
Japan was handicapped by its leaders’ inability to stay in oﬃce long 
enough to develop a rapport with their Chinese counterparts. Japan’s 
protracted political transition, which began in the early 1990s with 
the breakup of the conservative LDP, left the Japanese people feeling 
less conﬁdent in their own government. With the notable exception 
of Koizumi’s ﬁve-year tenure, Japan’s prime ministers changed virtu-
ally every year. Then in 2009, Japanese voters chose a new party to 
rule Japan. The arrival of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)—a 
new, untested political party—did not restore public conﬁdence in 
government but shook it even further, especially in its handling of 
foreign aﬀairs. Japan’s relations with Washington were strained over 
the basing of U.S. military forces in Okinawa, and despite the DPJ’s 
commitment to closer ties with Seoul and Beijing, Japan’s regional 
relationships also suﬀered. Not all the blame can be placed on the 
DPJ, though, as their leaders were confronted with two unprec-
edented political crises with Beijing over the islands. Nonetheless, 
successive DPJ prime ministers had to contend with harsh criticism 
at home from their conservative opposition as well as the public.
Both Japanese liberals and conservatives found it increasingly dif-
ﬁcult to ﬁnd partners among the new generation of Chinese leaders. 
The LDP had been in oﬃce for decades, and the earlier generation 
of its leaders had developed close ties with the leaders of the Chi-
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nese Communist Party. As a new force in Japanese politics, the DPJ 
did not have this legacy and had to work at building relationships 
with China’s leaders. Once the DPJ became the ruling party, Ozawa 
Ichirō, the party’s secretary-general, took 143 new DPJ Diet members 
to visit with the Chinese leadership, a move that the Japanese media 
(and members of conservative party) suggested was evidence of his 
“pro-China” position. Even though Ozawa had cultivated ties with 
leading Chinese Communist Party members over many years, the 
DPJ was unable to translate those personal connections into political 
capital when the 2010 crisis over the Chinese trawler erupted. Despite 
repeated eﬀorts to communicate with top party leaders, including 
sending Hosono Gōshi, one of Ozawa’s protégés, to Beijing, the DPJ 
government found that China had little interest in compromise as 
tensions escalated. Even those in the LDP with well-maintained ties 
to China’s leadership found it diﬃcult to ﬁnd channels of communi-
cation in Beijing.
The Japanese public, too, was increasingly skeptical of the Chinese 
government. While personal ties between Japanese and Chinese lead-
ers have weakened, Japanese public opinion of China has gradually 
soured. By 2013, according to a poll conducted by Genron NPO and 
the China Daily, 90.1 percent of Japanese said they had a negative 
attitude toward China, even though more and more Japanese have 
had ﬁrsthand experience of China. China was the number-one desti-
nation for Japanese tourists; in fact, Japanese account for the greatest 
number of foreign visitors to China. As of 2013, more than 3.5 mil-
lion Japanese had visited China each year, with the number climb-
ing 70 percent from 2000 to 2010. In addition, more than 125,000 
Japanese live in China. Similarly, more than 1 million Chinese citi-
zens have visited Japan, and after visa restrictions were lifted in 2011, 
more are expected each year. China was the number-two country of 
origin, behind South Korea, for visitors to Japan. Many Chinese stu-
dents study in Japan, and more and more Chinese are ﬁnding Japan 
an attractive destination for second homes. Needless to say, Chinese 
products, ﬁrms, and capital aﬀect Japan’s domestic economy in new 
ways, although this economic interdependence has not forestalled 
the perception in Japan that the Chinese government was becoming 
uncooperative with or even hostile to Japan.
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REACHING A RESOLUTION—OR NOT
Diplomacy alone has been insuﬃcient to bridge the growing num-
ber of diﬀerences between Tokyo and Beijing. The failure to solve 
problems has led to growing frustration among the Japanese public. 
While China cannot be held accountable for all the diﬃculties in the 
relationship, adjusting to its growing inﬂuence is a new challenge for 
both governments. For Tokyo, however, many of the old ways of man-
aging its relationship with Beijing no longer are eﬀective. All coun-
tries in Asia, in fact, must adjust to the changing nature and origin 
of China’s economic and military inﬂuence. For countries like Japan, 
which live in interdependent economies and in geographic proxim-
ity to a transforming China, the task is persuading their own citizens 
that their governments are well equipped to guide that adjustment. 
To date, successive governments in Japan have found adjustment 
problematic, with a wide array of domestic interests and advocates 
demanding greater protection from Chinese inﬂuence. Not all the 
issues, however, have involved Chinese behavior directed at Japan; 
nonetheless, China’s pursuit of its expanding interests is aﬀecting 
Japanese interests in new ways.
The Japanese experience also demonstrates the public’s heightened 
sensitivity to the perception of greater Chinese inﬂuence on their 
society. The repeated tit-for-tat escalation in tensions between Japan 
and China suggests a tendency toward confrontation between the two 
governments. But as this book demonstrates, this was not driven by a 
strategic decision to confront China. On the contrary, accommodation 
rather than confrontation seems to have been the diplomatic choice.
Japan’s leaders have not been able to implement this choice, how-
ever, for mainly domestic reasons. Policy diﬀerences across a range 
of issues reveal the complex assortment of Japanese who see their 
choices aﬀected by Chinese behavior. The domestic factors support-
ing—and opposing—collaboration with Beijing will shape the resolu-
tion of these problems. Crafting a set of shared diplomatic goals with 
Beijing thus is only one part of Japan’s eﬀort. A much less appreci-
ated—but equally important—requirement is managing the Japanese 
interests that will ultimately be aﬀected by China’s policy decisions. 
While many in Japan anticipated the rise of Chinese inﬂuence on 
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global and regional relationships, very few predicted how much that 
inﬂuence would shape Japan’s domestic politics. More often than not, 
this homegrown criticism has been directed just as much at the Japa-
nese government as at Beijing.
Four Cases of Contention, 2001–2014
The domestic interests forming Japan’s relationship with China are 
many, and their ability to determine the Japanese government’s deci-
sion making on China varies as well across policy issues. Four such 
cases oﬀer insights into the domestic interests that inﬂuenced Japa-
nese policymaking on China over the past decade: Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the eﬀort to negotiate shared 
use of the East China Sea, the gyōza (dumpling) food-poisoning inci-
dent, and the Senkaku shokku (Senkaku shock), which began with 
a Chinese ﬁshing captain’s provocation of the Japan Coast Guard 
in 2010 and ultimately produced a standoﬀ two years later between 
Japanese and Chinese patrols claiming sovereignty over the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.
Two of these cases revolve around old issues, issues that evoke 
powerful popular sentiments and threaten Japan’s national identity. 
The ﬁrst is the Japanese state’s eﬀort to memorialize its war dead. The 
controversial Yasukuni Shrine has been the focus of conservative 
eﬀorts to pay tribute to those who died in the name of the emperor 
in World War II, a war of aggression and imperial ambition in China 
as well as against the United States in the Paciﬁc. Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s commitment to visit Yasukuni on the date of Japan’s sur-
render, August 15, led to a deep spiral downward in the Japan-China 
relationship. It also reopened public debate over the status of the 
shrine and the leaders designated as class-A war criminals. Seven 
years later, Prime Minister Abe reopened this debate over the shrine’s 
signiﬁcance, revealing the gap between domestic Japanese views and 
the international understanding of Yasukuni’s meaning. Even Wash-
ington was concerned that Abe was deliberately raising tensions in 
the region.
A second bone of contention, as yet unresolved, is the eﬀort to 
navigate diﬀerences in the maritime boundaries in the East China 
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Sea. These diﬀerences date from the early 1970s and were part of the 
normalization talks between Tokyo and Beijing that led to the 1978 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Japan’s maritime interest in the East 
China Sea includes access to resources, such as ﬁsheries, seabed min-
erals, and energy resources, as well as the broader debate over how 
to delineate Japanese and Chinese territorial and exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) boundaries according to international law. The UN Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) presented a new eﬀort to 
deﬁne the maritime economic rights of coastal states and to resolve 
conﬂicts over contested areas. China challenged not only Japan’s 
long-standing territorial claims to the Senkaku Islands but also its 
interpretation of its maritime boundaries and claims. Eﬀorts to nego-
tiate a shared approach to joint research on seabed energy resources 
went nowhere, and the upswing in China’s maritime activities in and 
around Japan’s waters became a cause for protest and contention. 
Both the issue of Japan’s war memory and its maritime rights in the 
East China Sea rose to the top of the bilateral agenda and became the 
sources of a dispute that was much more public than ever before.
The two remaining disputes reveal more potent public sensitivi-
ties that have taken center stage in Japan-China diplomacy. One is 
Japan’s dependence on food imports from China. Imports of agricul-
tural products, such as vegetables and rice, were on the rise. Cheaper 
and more easily available than Japanese vegetables, these imports 
had broad appeal to Japanese consumers. Moreover, Japan’s food-
processing industry had moved oﬀshore to Chinese locales where 
cheap labor and proximity to agricultural products resulted in less 
expensive goods back home. On January 30, 2008, imported poisoned 
dumplings prompted a widespread investigation into China’s role in 
supplying Japan’s food. The gyōza-poisoning case, however, revealed 
the limits of Japanese oversight in Chinese factories and the lack of 
eﬀective domestic procedures for ensuring consumer safety in Japan.
The last case is as old as the postwar relationship. The diﬀer-
ences between Beijing and Tokyo over the sovereignty of the Sen-
kaku/Diaoyu Islands were clear during normalization talks in the 
late 1970s, but today this territorial dispute has ﬂared up in Japan 
as a potent emblem of national identity. The growing civic activism 
has brought ﬁshermen and activists alike across the East China Sea 
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to attempt landing on the uninhabited islands. In September 2010, 
however, the provocative behavior of a Chinese ﬁshing-boat captain 
instigated a sharp escalation in bilateral tensions. Nationalistic eﬀorts 
to assert Japan’s control over the islands—for years the domain of 
small activist groups and local politicians—went mainstream after 
Governor Ishihara announced a campaign to raise money to pur-
chase the islands and the LDP, in opposition at the time, argued to 
inhabit them. The national government’s long-standing eﬀort to keep 
the islands oﬀ the bilateral agenda with Beijing was no longer work-
able at home. National purchase became the only way of forestalling 
conservative calls for a more assertive defense of Japan’s sovereignty 
over the islands. In addition, this issue became fodder for domestic 
political gain as frustration with the national government’s leadership 
gave upcoming politicians a tactical advantage.
Domestic Interests and Japan’s China Policy
In each case, Japan’s policy diﬀers and thus reﬂects the variety of inter-
ests associated with that policy’s outcome. Cumulatively, however, these 
cases oﬀer some insight into whether there is a broader nationalist or 
anti-China advocacy developing in Japanese politics. In other words, 
is there evidence of serious—and mounting—advocacy for resisting 
Chinese power? Have preferences in Japan shifted suﬃciently to per-
suade the government that compromise in negotiation with Beijing 
ought to be abandoned? What issues can the Japanese government 
compromise on, and which will elicit a domestic backlash? Is there 
evidence of a consensus in Japan on the impact of China’s rise, and if 
so, what does that consensus mean for Japanese behavior?
None of these cases represents deliberate behavior by China that 
is intended to cause Japan harm, nor does Japan’s policymaking 
reﬂect a similar intention. Rather, in large part these cases are conten-
tious because they resist a clear-cut resolution, and the negotiation 
of conﬂicting interests demands compromise. These are the issues 
over which we would expect interest groups to forge alliances and/or 
over which broad-based anti-China sentiment might ﬁnd a foothold. 
These are the very issues in which domestic pressures on the gov-
ernment to either stand up to China or resist compromise should be 
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most conspicuous. Therefore, these cases allow insight into the poten-
tial for new coalitions to emerge in Japan, coalitions with preferences 
that would impinge speciﬁcally on the Japanese government’s ability 
to negotiate with China.
All four of these cases pertain to issues that resonate in the debate 
over Japan’s postwar identity. The Yasukuni Shrine has long been seen 
as a contentious issue between Japan’s conservative nationalists who 
seek to restore honor to the Japanese state and postwar liberals who 
argue for the protections of popular sovereignty in Japan’s postwar 
constitution. Chinese oﬃcials often present a slightly diﬀerent narra-
tive, framing their criticism as aimed at Japan’s “militaristic” or “right 
wing” leaders rather than against the Japanese people. In both narra-
tives, the question really is about whether Japan today is—or ought 
to be—diﬀerent from prewar Japan. Issues such as Japan’s diﬀerences 
with China over the maritime boundary in the East China Sea and 
the territorial dispute over the Senkakus have obvious implications 
for Japan’s security policy and its commitment to resolve diﬀerences 
through diplomacy and multilateral dispute resolution mechanisms 
rather than by military force. Even the food safety issue is embed-
ded in a domestic debate over self-reliance and the extent to which 
Japan should commit to a liberal trading order and open its mar-
ket to foreign goods. Rallying around the call for a new approach to 
Japan’s public policy choices in any of these cases would not necessar-
ily be equivalent to resisting China (or adopting an anti-China pol-
icy stance). Yet as China’s rise continues, Japan’s success or failure at 
negotiating its interests with Beijing will aﬀect the tolerance in Japan 
of the vulnerabilities that have attended its postwar foreign policy 
commitments supporting self-restraint on the use of military force 
and a liberalized global market economy.
Finally, if China’s rise is producing greater nationalistic sentiment 
in Japan, then the question is whether that sentiment will be trans-
lated into political activism. And if so, by whom? If China’s inﬂuence 
is producing more support for a nationalistic agenda, then the evi-
dence should emerge from these cases of contention. Domestic inter-
ests converge around each policy area, but do these repeated frictions 
with China oﬀer an opportunity to advocate and mobilize around 
the cause of greater Japanese nationalism? If so, then those interests 
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active in one case should be creating networks of cooperation with 
interests across issue areas. In addition, do these advocates seeking 
to inﬂuence the debate over Japan’s national choices and preferences 
ﬁnd common cause with others who also want their government to 
take a ﬁrmer stance toward China? Japan’s strategic eﬀort to oppose 
or join with China will need advocates to lead it and will need domes-
tic support if it is to be executed successfully. The domestic interests 
on which Tokyo’s strategic choices vis-à-vis China are based will be an 
important determinant of diplomatic success. Diﬀerentiating those 
seeking a role in making Japan’s strategic choices from those seeking 
Japanese government protection of their own interests is the ﬁrst step 
in understanding the impact of domestic politics on Japan’s choices. 
A second task is considering the balance of advocacy in Japan on 
policies related to China to determine whether perceptions of China 
may be suﬃcient to prompt a signiﬁcant realignment of Japan’s post-
war politics.
The disputes over territory and over sharing the East China Sea are 
issues for which agreement seems remote. Despite the seeming trend 
toward confrontation, however, Tokyo and Beijing have found ample 
room for compromise. A less appreciated aspect of Japan-China rela-
tions is the relationship between China policy and the pressures at 
home for policy reform in Japan. Over the past decade or more, there 
has been a considerable rethinking of some Japanese policies in order 
to better adapt to the new China.
Japan’s dissatisfaction with relying on a strategy of political rec-
onciliation with China based solely on economic cooperation had 
already become evident by the late 1990s. The end of the Cold War 
changed the geostrategic context in which Beijing and Japan had 
been operating since signing the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 
1978. But Japan’s domestic politics also were in ﬂux, and the political 
transition away from the LDP’s single-party dominance created new 
questions about Japan’s foreign policy goals, especially with regard to 
its relationship with China and the United States and about the ability 
of Japan’s government to create and sustain a new diplomatic strategy 
toward Beijing.
This elite consensus was accompanied by a deterioration of Japa-
nese public opinion regarding China. Popular sensitivities to what 
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seemed to be a greater vulnerability to Chinese decision making has 
complicated Japanese policymaking. Here, contentious incidents 
rather than long-standing cooperation have encouraged the debate 
about China’s rise and what it means for Japan’s own governance. 
Each case that I examine in this book oﬀers insights into the way 
that Chinese inﬂuences on Japanese society are perceived and into 
the relations among the various domestic actors and agents shaping 
Japan’s domestic policymaking on China.
Taken together, these cases also oﬀer some suggestions for the 
future. The ability of both governments to manage each other’s vul-
nerabilities will determine the trajectory of Japan-China relations. By 
their very nature, these issues suggest competing rather than comple-
mentary interests, and left unresolved, they carry the potential for 
aggravating popular anxiety in Japan and creating support for con-
frontation with China. To be successful, Japanese leaders must per-
suade their public that cooperation with China will reduce Japan’s 
vulnerabilities rather than exacerbate them.
2
DIPLOMACY AND  
DOMESTIC INTERESTS
From normalization until the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, Japan’s 
relations with China were guided more by the legacy of the past and 
the need for postwar reconciliation than by the logic of geopolitics. 
Japan’s identity as an Asian power had been formed over a long and 
complex history of cultural and economic interactions with China. 
In the nineteenth century, when the contest for global resources 
reached Asia, Japan was determined to open its society to compete 
with the West. But Japan’s modernization led to its own imperial 
ambitions, and at the beginning of the twentieth century, it went to 
war with China. Japan’s desire to compete with the European powers 
had altered both nations, and in many ways, its rise as a great power 
came at China’s expense.
Japan’s attempt to dominate Asia ultimately failed, with a cata-
strophic loss of life. After World War II and Japan’s occupation by 
the United States and its allies, Japan and China did not resume dip-
lomatic ties for more than two decades. Economic ties were to be 
the path to reconciliation, with Japan fostering China’s economic 
development. By the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century, however, 
China’s remarkable economic transformation began to change the 
relationship, with its success ushering in a new era of Asian relations 
in which both China and Japan exerted considerable regional and 
global inﬂuence.
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Japan’s views of this new China are linked to its envisioned posi-
tion in the region and the world. Anticipation that China will one 
day overtake Japan in both wealth and military power has created 
uncertainty about not only their relationship but also Japan’s own 
global standing and security. Will a rising China overshadow Japan? 
Will China’s increasing material power and inﬂuence translate into 
a more assertive attitude toward Japan, and how will China’s greater 
inﬂuence aﬀect the long-standing Japanese alliance with the United 
States? Like many other Asian countries, Japan is grappling with a 
fundamental change in the Asia Paciﬁc, one that touches both its eco-
nomic prospects and its security. For Tokyo, this is not a theoretical 
problem; it already is beginning to shape its policy choices. Tensions 
with Beijing have steadily multiplied, and negotiations have become 
more diﬃcult. Japan’s experience with the new China provides a win-
dow on the unique characteristics of that bilateral relationship and 
also reveals common concerns about the trajectory of Asian interna-
tional relations. How Japan responds to China’s growing economic 
and military inﬂuence will shape the region for years to come.
In many ways, Japan’s policy debate mirrors the U.S. debate. China 
experts in America have cautioned the United States to be aware of 
how U.S. policy aﬀects Beijing’s calculations, and likewise, China 
has scrutinized the United States and its goals. The various inter-
pretations of Beijing’s ambitions continue, with suggestions for U.S. 
policymakers ranging from encouraging China to become a “respon-
sible stakeholder” to urging Washington to avoid the lure of the “G-2 
mirage” and to “buck China.” For those who worry about the inevita-
bility of China’s future dominance, the mechanics of past transitions 
in major power relations provide a cautionary tale. Rivalries abound, 
and wars seem inevitable; Germany’s rise in the early 1900s and its 
assertion of its interests in Europe are often used to suggest a paral-
lel with contemporary Asian politics. The Japanese, too, have begun 
to adopt this reference to modern European history. At the World 
Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, in January 2014, even Prime 
Minister Abe, in describing the dynamic between Japan and China, 
succumbed to this temptation when he compared contemporary ten-
sions in East Asia with those in 1914 and the competition of the Euro-
pean powers before World War I.
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However the trajectory of Chinese power unfolds, regional percep-
tions of Beijing’s inﬂuence merit careful attention, as they also aﬀect 
how Asian countries—particularly U.S. allies—see the United States. 
Conﬂict with China means that many of these countries, including 
Japan, have pursued even closer ties with Washington. For others, 
though, this may be too risky. While U.S. policy experts continue 
to explore avenues for directing Chinese behavior, Japanese experts 
see China as less susceptible to their inﬂuence and more focused 
on Washington. Sensitivity to the United States’ acknowledgment of 
Chinese power, such as its eﬀort to deﬁne a “new major power rela-
tionship,” colors Japanese assessments of the impact of China’s rise on 
their own country’s interests. For many Asian countries, the region’s 
international relations are not driven solely by China; they also are 
largely determined by perceptions of, and worries about, how the 
United States and its allies might respond to China.
No power in Asia has felt the changing inﬂuence of China as 
keenly as Japan. China’s economic growth has provided opportu-
nity for Japanese investment and trade; it has stimulated a reorgani-
zation of Japanese networks of production; and Chinese consumer 
demand will drive Japanese product development in the years to 
come. Because China and Japan depend on each other for their own 
national economic success, despite political tensions, this economic 
interdependence has remained largely unchanged. But other fac-
tors shape the relationship as well. Geography brings Japan close to 
China’s military modernization. Japan is oﬀshore the continent of 
Asia, its maritime boundary stretching from the tip of the Korean 
Peninsula to the southwestern Japanese islands. From Japan, it is 
only a thirty-minute ﬂight to Taiwan to the south and a one- to 
two-hour ﬂight to most cities on the Chinese coast by commercial 
jet, albeit less by military aircraft. On the sea, Japanese ﬁshing boats 
and other civilian ships share the East China Sea with Taiwanese, 
Chinese, and Korean counterparts. Protecting that coastline poses 
a considerable challenge for the Japan Coast Guard and other mari-
time agencies, and as Chinese maritime interests have widened, 
the East China Sea and the straits between the Japanese islands 
have become a natural route of egress for civilian and military ves-
sels seeking the open ocean.
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Diplomacy has not yet proved to be a reliable instrument for solv-
ing Japan’s tensions with China. After the ﬁrst diplomatic “chill” that 
developed during the latter years of the Koizumi Jun’ichirō cabinet, 
leaders in Beijing and Tokyo sought to redeﬁne their bilateral rela-
tionship to accommodate the new balance of interests in the relation-
ship. Yet even this high-level summitry could not stem the repeated 
frustrations. Just two years after the Fukuda-Hu summit, the island 
dispute quickly derailed the governments’ eﬀort to create “mutually 
beneﬁcial relations based on common strategic interests.”
China’s economic growth alone, however, cannot explain this 
diplomatic impasse between Tokyo and Beijing. Its future remains 
unpredictable, and its eﬀort to raise the standard of living for all its 
citizens remains incomplete. Indeed, despite all the country’s eco-
nomic accomplishments, most Chinese today have a quality of life 
far inferior to that of most Japanese. China’s per capita GDP remains 
around one-tenth of Japan’s, and environmental degradation threat-
ens the health and safety of its citizens. Income disparity remains 
a serious social problem, and the slowing rate of growth in China 
will make the Chinese people’s expectations of improving the qual-
ity of their lives even more diﬃcult to achieve. This will likely keep 
the attention of the country’s leaders ﬁrmly focused on their domes-
tic challenges and will complicate Beijing’s international ambitions. 
Nonetheless, even though China’s rise as a global power is not yet 
complete, the potential of a more powerful Beijing antagonistic to 
Japanese interests infuses foreign policy thinking in Tokyo today.
JAPAN AND CHINA: A NEW DYNAMIC
China’s ascension in 2010 to the number-two spot in the world econ-
omy was widely interpreted as a sign of Japan’s eclipse (ﬁgure 2.1). 
Foreign direct investment was bypassing Tokyo and Osaka and head-
ing to China’s burgeoning urban centers. Trade between China and 
the rest of the world was booming, and by 2005, China had become 
Japan’s largest trading partner, with China trade comprising 20 per-
cent of Japan’s total trade. Moreover, besides transforming the Jap-
anese economy, the Chinese economy was outperforming it on the 
global stage.
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China’s interests in the Asia Paciﬁc now were challenging the 
economic ties that, for decades, had been the foundation for Japan’s 
regional leadership. Ever since its own economic rise in the 1960s, 
Japan has been the ascendant power in Asia, providing much needed 
trade and investment to a region largely composed of developing 
economies. Japanese companies built infrastructure and facilitated 
technology transfers to the newly emerging economies in Southeast 
Asia, and Japan’s “developmental state” became the model of Asian 
forms of state capitalism. By the 1980s, Japan led a “ﬂying geese” for-
mation of Asian economies. It had also become a major advocate for 
regional institution building, played an important role in the forma-
tion of the Asia-Paciﬁc Economic Community and later the ASEAN 
Regional Forum, and sought to play a similarly dominant role in Asia 
Paciﬁc political institutions.
Japan began to fade from regional aﬀairs by the late 1990s just as 
China began to become a more integral diplomatic player in Asia. 
Since then, it has been Beijing rather than Tokyo that has inﬂuenced 
FIGURE 2.1 Japan’s and China’s GDP. Data is in current U.S. dollars. (Data Catalog, 
World Bank, last updated April 16, 2013, http://datacatalog.worldbank.org/) 
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regional dynamics. Asian responses to China’s rise reveal that most 
Asian states are no longer looking to Tokyo, but focusing their atten-
tion on whether the United States can counter Beijing’s inﬂuence. 
Japan is no longer seen as the dominant inﬂuence in the region. In 
Southeast Asia, “soft” balancing through diplomatic and economic 
means and a reliance on ASEAN-based regional institutions have 
been the predominant recourse of the smaller states on China’s 
periphery. Domestically, virtually every Asian country has found 
that more and more national economic choices have had some bear-
ing on its relations with China. Indeed, the impulse of all Asian pow-
ers, large and small, has been to hedge their bets.
Japan has been no exception. Since the beginning of the postwar 
era, Tokyo’s alliance with the United States and its diplomacy with 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been at odds. Although 
the Cold War dampened the tension, when the two Asian nations 
normalized relations in 1978, the balancing act between Japan’s his-
toric ties to the Asian mainland and its postwar alliance with the 
United States was made manageable by China’s turn toward creating 
a market economy. Beijing’s economic success and its emergence as 
a global economic force, however, raised new pressures on Japanese 
diplomacy. Richard Samuels argues that Japan sought a “dual hedge,” 
seeking economic beneﬁt from Beijing while relying on the United 
States to provide security assurance. In Japan, Samuels found evi-
dence that foreign policy experts are not, however, unanimous in their 
support for this “dual-hedging” strategy in the face of China’s rise. 
Mike Mochizuki sees greater continuity in the Japanese debate and 
argues that China’s increasing economic power exaggerates what has 
long been part of Tokyo’s foreign policy goals: an eﬀort to ﬁnd greater 
autonomy of choice in its relationship with China while still main-
taining its alliance with Washington. Both Samuels and Mochizuki, 
however, point out the tension in Japan’s alliance relationship with 
Washington and the eﬀort to develop closer relations with Beijing, 
a tension that has brought greater contest over the past decade as 
the shift in regional and global power in the direction of China has 
become more conspicuous.
Yet hedging as a strategic response can become diﬃcult to sus-
tain when domestic interests are competing for policy attention. 
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These interests are often driven by factors independent of the stra-
tegic logic that focuses on the systemic consequences of China’s 
rise. Instead, domestic interests perceive of and react to their own 
experience of Chinese power, and as a result, they become active 
advocates for government attention. In other words, the domes-
tic impact of China’s power also guides Japan’s response. Failure 
to explore the domestic politics that lead the adjustment to a new 
source of global power overlooks the pressures on governments 
trying to adjust to geopolitical change. Carefully calibrated strate-
gies can be easily derailed by popular emotions and political oppor-
tunity. Much of the policy debate on how to manage a changing 
China has not taken into account the domestic pressures that con-
front government policymakers.
Japan’s strategic response to China’s economic rise has yet to be 
clearly articulated and has not reﬂected a unity of purpose between 
Japan’s government and private actors. For example, Japanese busi-
ness leaders have rarely wavered in their support for greater eco-
nomic interdependence, and indeed, Japanese investment in China 
has continued to grow even as Japanese government oﬃcials have 
become more wary of diplomatic compromise with China. Even 
though diplomats and political leaders continue to advocate the 
“win-win” opportunities of cooperation with China, they are stum-
bling from controversy to controversy, proving that the interests of 
Tokyo and Beijing are not often in sync. Increasingly punctuated by 
crises and, most recently, by the clash of maritime agencies over the 
territorial disputes in the East China Sea, the relationship between 
Japan and China seems to resist past diplomatic formulas for sus-
tained cooperation. Despite their shared economic interests, neither 
government seems to have a viable strategy for coping with their 
political diﬀerences.
Japan has been unable to hedge in its strategy toward China largely 
because of domestic interests. In the past, there was a coalition of sup-
port for a conciliatory policy toward China. Cooperation with Beijing 
was the objective, based on the premise that closer relations between 
the two countries was in Japan’s best interests. To be sure, the basic 
lines of contention over China policy were identiﬁable in postwar 
politics. Japan’s progressives and conservatives have disagreed over 
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the need for apologizing for its wartime conquest of China; Japan’s 
politicians and business leaders have taken diﬀerent approaches to 
managing their bilateral relations; and the Japanese public has seemed 
torn between the desire to reconcile over the past and to craft a new 
relationship for the future.
But the domestic debate over China policy has been far from 
static. As the Chinese economy grew and the relationship with Japan 
became more interdependent, domestic support in Japan for a dip-
lomatic accommodation of China’s internal transformation began to 
shift. China’s economic and military choices raised awareness of the 
possibility for a more contentious China in the future, and despite 
Beijing’s eﬀorts to articulate its strategy of a “peaceful rise,” Tokyo’s 
relations with China seemed increasingly and consistently fraught. 
Beyond Japan’s political and bureaucratic elites, the constellation 
of interests with a stake in Japan’s policy toward China also grew. 
Japan’s business elites continued to be strong supporters of a close 
relationship with China, but at times they seemed overshadowed by 
more virulent voices with a distinctly anti-China tone. The business 
community still claims a central role in the China policy debate, but it 
plays a less visible role than in the past. Popular opinion of China, too, 
began to cool. Japan’s own economic diﬃculties undoubtedly played a 
role, but the tensions with China over history and trade made for less 
public support for compromise with Beijing. Focused on the Chinese 
government’s criticism of Japan, popular skepticism over Chinese 
intentions rose as policy diﬀerences emerged, creating a much more 
precarious domestic climate in which to argue the merits of coopera-
tion with China.
Diplomatic frustrations with China coincided with the 1990s eﬀort 
to reform Japanese politics. Advocates of reform, such as the LDP 
politician Ozawa Ichirō, sought a more competitive party system, with 
alternating parties in power oﬀering new policy choices. Japanese 
voters then would exercise their choice for building a “new Japan” 
through the electoral process. Preoccupied with this new era of 
political reform, Japan’s bureaucracies had to contend with the growth 
in Chinese inﬂuence while politicians paid scant attention to the 
need for a coherent strategy vis-à-vis China. As a multitude of parties 
and personalities contended for political power, Japan’s conservatives 
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looked for coalition partners in the most unlikely of places. The 
LDP even joined forces with its postwar nemesis, the Japan Social-
ist Party (JSP), and the JSP’s leader, Murayama Tomiichi, became the 
prime minister of Japan in 1994. Prime Minister Murayama reached a 
compromise with Japan’s conservatives on an issue of deep ideologi-
cal contention—a clear and heartfelt apology for Japan’s twentieth- 
century history—and this seemed to bring an end to their postwar 
ideological feud. But even this was not to last. 
Political power in Japan became more diﬀuse, and only one leader, 
Koizumi, managed to sustain his hold on power long enough to recon-
sider Japan’s evolving strategic position. Koizumi tried to persuade 
Beijing of the two countries’ mutual interests but was unsuccessful in 
moving forward their debate over the past. With his repeated visits 
to the Yasukuni Shrine, Koizumi enraged Chinese leaders and ended 
his tenure in oﬃce with a “freeze” in diplomatic relations. In 2009, 
the LDP lost power to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), ushering 
in a new but ultimately frustrated eﬀort to negotiate a new “mutu-
ally beneﬁcial” relationship with China. Uncertainty was becom-
ing the norm in Tokyo’s political relations with Beijing, and Japan’s 
politicians could not build a partnership with China’s new emerging 
leaders. For more than forty years, Japan’s diplomacy toward China 
had been driven by the hope for reconciliation, but in Japan, there 
was a greater focus on a more reciprocal—and less apologetic— 
premise for Japan-China relations.
FROM RECONCILIATION TO RECIPROCITY
Japan’s objectives in its relationship with China have evolved since 
the conclusion of the 1978 peace treaty. Perhaps most important ini-
tially was the end of the Cold War dynamics that had determined 
the strategic context of normalization. China’s dependence on Japa-
nese economic assistance dwindled as its own economy took oﬀ, and 
postwar reconciliation proved illusory as political sensitivities over 
historical memory intensiﬁed nationalistic impulses in both societies.
As many scholars of the Sino-Japanese relationship have noted, 
the bilateral relationship seemed resistant to stability. Diplomacy 
between Tokyo and Beijing was never completely smooth, and yet 
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the two governments extensively enlarged their policy cooperation 
to include a complex array of interests. As Ming Wan points out in 
his seminal study of Sino-Japan relations, “Sino-Japanese relations 
peaked in 1978, with subsequent cooperative periods never matching 
the heights of collaboration reached those years,” and over time, the 
“emerging rivalry” between the two was unmistakable. Explanations 
for the rocky diplomatic relationship vary. Ming Wan ﬁnds structural 
causes, as does Tanaka Akihiko, who situates Japan’s foreign policy 
within a changing Asia. For Tanaka, who has written extensively on 
Japan’s relations with China, it is the end of the Cold War and the 
blossoming of Asian regionalism that best frame the Japanese experi-
ence with China.
Other Japan experts on China look more closely at who managed 
the bilateral relationship and to what end. For some, the shift from a 
relationship deﬁned by the terms of reconciliation to one that could 
withstand the pressures of the new strategic context after the Cold 
War provides an important frame for considering the changing pat-
terns in Sino-Japanese relations. Kokubun Ryōsei analyzed the man-
agement of Sino-Japanese relations in Iwanami shoten’s new six-vol-
ume series on Japan’s diplomacy (Nihon no gaikō). He breaks Japan’s 
relationship with China into three phases, roughly twenty years apart, 
each with a distinct pattern of relationship management. The ﬁrst, 
1952 to 1972, covers the period before normalization when Tokyo rec-
ognized the Republic of China (ROC) in Taibei; the second, 1972 to 
1992, spans the era when Beijing saw Tokyo as a valuable economic 
partner after its decision to open its economy; and ﬁnally, the recent 
period from 1992 to the present includes both the rise of Chinese 
global economic inﬂuence and the domestic shift in Japan from a 
single-party-dominant government to a protracted period of politi-
cal transition. For Kokubun, it is this coincidence of the emergence 
of Chinese global inﬂuence and domestic political change in Japan 
that created the contentious and unpredictable nature of the Sino-
Japanese relationship today.
Another perspective relies more on the intertwined history of the 
national identity struggles of China and Japan. In her historical over-
view of the Sino-Japanese relationship, Mori Kazuko ﬁnds a complex 
reﬂection of both nations’ idea of “postwar” in their eﬀorts to build 
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a “special relationship” deﬁned by China’s eﬀort to modernize and 
Japan’s struggle with its past. More recently, Japanese writing on con-
temporary China has sought to explain to a Japanese audience the 
sources of “anti-Japan” sentiment in China. In addition, many Japa-
nese scholars take a more issue-oriented approach to examining the 
Sino-Japanese relationship. Regardless of their approach, however, 
virtually all agree that by the end of the twentieth century, Japan’s 
relationship with China had reached a critical turning point.
A new strategic consensus began to emerge as Japan’s interests 
were challenged by China. Over time, four aspects of Japanese policy 
proved to need rethinking. The ﬁrst was the end of the Cold War and 
its impact on Japan’s assessment of its diplomatic role in Asia. From 
the Cold War’s deﬁnition of an East-West divide to the more cultur-
ally driven sense of diﬀerence between the advanced economies of 
the West and the developing economies of Asia, Japan developed a 
strategy for mediating between China and the liberal democracies 
of the United States and Europe. Second, Tokyo’s early reliance on 
mutual economic interests as the primary determinant of Japan-
China relations could not be sustained as China’s economy grew 
and Japan’s stalled. Japan’s own economic growth prospects became 
more closely tied to Chinese economic performance, and new fac-
tors, including Chinese economic policymaking, began to aﬀect 
bilateral economic ties. The third factor was the awareness of the 
limits of reconciliation diplomacy for guiding Japan’s relations with 
China. High-level state visits and Japan’s eﬀort to state its remorse 
for its war eﬀort in China had only limited success in ending China’s 
criticism of Japan’s past military behavior. Finally, the Taiwan Straits 
crisis in 1996 alerted many Japanese policymakers to China’s poten-
tial use of military force in Northeast Asia, raising yet another con-
cern for Tokyo’s military planners.
Bridging Diplomatic Divides
Until normalization in the 1970s, the Cold War divided Japan and 
China; afterward, Japan increasingly saw its role as a bridge between 
its Western partners and its modernizing Asian neighbor. Japan’s post-
war relationship with China came on the heels of President Richard 
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Nixon’s historic trip to Beijing in 1972. In a deﬁning moment in Asia’s 
Cold War experience, Chinese leaders turned away from their Soviet 
allies and toward a new relationship with the United States and Japan. 
That geostrategic opportunity was the beginning of a process of post-
war reconciliation that many in Japan felt was long overdue.
Beijing’s strategic calculus was diﬀerent. Chinese leaders were 
interested primarily in limiting Soviet inﬂuence in Asia and therefore 
insisted that Tokyo agree to block any attempt at hegemonic domi-
nance in Asia. Although negotiations on the treaty began in 1974, it 
was not until 1975 that Japanese negotiators realized that this clause 
would hinder ratiﬁcation of the bilateral peace treaty; instead, Japan’s 
leaders worried that Taiwan would be an obstacle. Beijing was will-
ing to leave Taiwan out of the talks, however. In January 1975, the 
Japanese government produced a tentative draft of a treaty, and in 
response, Zhou Enlai later conveyed to a leading LDP Diet member 
the idea that “opposing superpower hegemony” was China’s national 
policy and that he expected Sino-Japanese normalization to oﬀset 
Soviet “hegemonic” ambitions.
This idea raised all sorts of red ﬂags in the Japanese government. 
The pro-Taibei groups in the ruling LDP argued that it would harm 
relations with Moscow, and the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, too, saw 
the potential damage to Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union, by get-
ting in the way of a resolution of its territorial dispute with Moscow. 
Progressives in Japan were torn between their support for Moscow 
and Beijing; the Japan Socialist Party favored Beijing, whereas the 
Japan Communist Party continued to look to Moscow. In the end, 
factional pressures within the LDP—coupled with intense “people’s 
diplomacy” by the Beijing government—forced Prime Minister Miki 
Takeo’s hand, and the Japanese government agreed to include in the 
treaty language opposing hegemony. For many, this was a step back 
from the diplomatic aim of “equidistance” that Japan had crafted to 
cope with the complex major power relations of that period. Yet, the 
failure to conclude a peace treaty also began to have serious political 
costs for Prime Minister Miki, as Japanese businesses and the public 
wanted the long overdue diplomatic relationship with China to begin.
Japan’s opening to China also came on the heels of a signiﬁcant 
development in U.S.-Japan relations. Okinawa, Japan’s southernmost 
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prefecture, remained under the administration of the United States, 
and the extended occupation included its free use of the exten-
sive military bases built there during the Korean War. The United 
States used these bases for its combat sorties in Vietnam, prompt-
ing widespread demonstrations on the island that eventually fed 
into the national antiwar movement. By 1968, the U.S. and Japa-
nese governments had agreed to begin discussing the reversion of 
Okinawa to Japanese control, and in 1969, the Nixon-Satō commu-
niqué formally began the negotiations for Okinawa’s reversion to 
Japan. Included in the Ryukyu Islands were the small, uninhabited 
islets, known as the Senkakus to the Japanese, which became the 
focal point of considerable diﬃculty in the Japan-China negotia-
tions over a peace treaty.
The negotiations over the reversion of Okinawa led to Taiwan-
ese and then Chinese protests to the U.S. government. At the time, 
the United States maintained formal diplomatic relations with the 
ROC, but the Nixon White House—as later become known—was 
at this time laying the groundwork for its historic “opening” to the 
PRC in Beijing. In 1970, the ambassador of the ROC presented the 
U.S. government with his objections to Japanese sovereignty over the 
Senkakus. Three months later, China’s Xinhua news agency issued a 
statement, interpreted as the oﬃcial PRC position, that the islands 
belonged to Taiwan and thus to the PRC. On March 15, 1971, the 
embassy of the Republic of China in Washington sent the U.S. State 
Department a note verbale outlining its claim to sovereignty over 
the Senkakus.
The ROC’s argument was based on several points: the historical 
record of a boundary between the disputed islands and the King-
dom of the Ryukyus (later incorporated into the Japanese Empire 
as Okinawa); the geological features separating the islands from 
the Ryukyus by the Okinawa Trough at the end of the continental 
shelf; and the use of these islands by Taiwanese ﬁshermen as tradi-
tional ﬁshing grounds. Claiming that the Japanese government did 
not include the islands as Japanese territory until after China was 
defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and forced to cede Tai-
wan and the Pescadores to Japan, the Chinese government asked the 
United States at the end of its administration of the Ryukyu Islands 
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to return them to the Republic of China. This Chinese scrutiny of 
the U.S. negotiations to return the Ryukyus to Japanese sovereignty 
coincided with the now famous secret diplomacy between the Nixon 
White House and China’s top leaders that led to Washington’s nor-
malization talks with Beijing.
By mid-April, President Nixon’s national security adviser, Henry 
Kissinger, had requested information on Taiwan’s claim, which was 
provided to him by John H. Holdridge of the National Security 
Council (NSC) staﬀ. Based on his notes at the time, it seems that Kiss-
inger wanted to explore ways to achieve greater U.S. “neutrality” in 
the dispute. Until this time, every U.S. administration had referred 
to Japan’s residual sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands, but a new lan-
guage in U.S. policy statements suggested a more ambiguous stance 
on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands. Details of Kissinger’s ﬁrst 
secret trip to Beijing in July and his later conversations with the Chi-
nese Communist Party leaders regarding these islands remain clas-
siﬁed. But the relationship with Taiwan was clearly on the minds of 
all the president’s advisers. Ten days before the Okinawa Reversion 
Agreement was to be signed in Washington, D.C., between President 
Richard Nixon and Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, the subject of the 
island dispute was raised again, this time by the president’s economic 
adviser, who saw the beneﬁt of retaining U.S. control over the islands 
in order to quell Taiwan’s opposition. At the time, the United States was 
looking for a deal with Taibei on textiles. In the end, President Nixon 
did not change the agreement to return the Ryukyus—including 
the disputed islands—to Japan. But the United States did step back 
from fully endorsing Japanese sovereignty, a position that it had 
taken since the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and instead adopted a 
legal position that it was neutral on the ultimate resolution of the 
competing sovereignty claims over the islands. Japan, too, embraced 
normalization of diplomatic relations with Beijing, and for decades, 
the territorial issue settled into the background.
A second moment when Japan and the United States diﬀered over 
China policy came after the Tiananmen Square confrontation in 1989. 
Far diﬀerent from the realpolitik of the Nixon administration, this 
raised questions about Tokyo’s and Washington’s interpretations of 
human rights. The gathering of students and citizens after the death 
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of Hu Yaobang threatened the Chinese leadership and the Commu-
nist Party’s control. In turn, the deployment of the Chinese military 
and police to suppress the demonstrations transformed China’s image 
from a modernizing state to an authoritarian regime and began an era 
of Western human rights activism on behalf of China’s dissidents. The 
United States and other Western nations imposed sanctions on China 
after its violent repression of the democracy protesters. A month later 
at the G7 Arch Summit, world leaders roundly “condemned the vio-
lent repression in China in deﬁance of human rights” and called on 
“Chinese authorities to cease action against those who have done no 
more than claim their legitimate rights to democracy and liberty.”
Unlike many Western states, Japan took time in formulating its 
response to the events of June 4, 1989. Until that moment, its post-
war diplomacy had relied almost exclusively on its own economic 
development and the support for the economic development goals of 
others in Asia. The Cold War had been largely in the hands of the 
two superpowers, with only a supporting role for the allies. Moreover, 
Japan’s leadership in the region emerged as its economy took oﬀ. The 
Japanese economic miracle was emulated across the region, includ-
ing in China. Economic growth became associated with political 
liberalization, and democratization movements spread across the Asia 
Paciﬁc, ousting leaders in the Philippines and South Korea and shak-
ing the governments in other societies in Southeast Asia. Amid these 
political changes in Asia, the Japanese government sought to focus 
its foreign policy and economic assistance on the economic develop-
ment goals of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
But the limits of Tokyo’s economic leadership were brought home 
when the Chinese government called out the military to confront stu-
dent democracy advocates in Tiananmen Square. Equally important, 
Japan’s close support for China’s economic modernization also came 
under scrutiny by the Western states. Media footage of the shocking 
convergence of student demonstrators and Chinese military tanks in 
the center of Beijing was broadcast live to a global audience, prompt-
ing outrage in Western nations. The United States and European 
nations called for immediate sanctions against the Chinese leader-
ship in protest of the human rights violations; but Tokyo cautioned 
the Western nations against an excessively punitive reaction to the 
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use of force, worrying about its repercussions on China’s modern-
ization eﬀort. At the time, Japan was China’s most generous donor, 
providing roughly 40 percent of all foreign assistance to China. On a 
bilateral basis, Japan provided 75 percent of all aid to China, ten times 
more than the second-highest donor (West Germany). Even so, the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and major Western 
nations imposed severe economic and military sanctions on China.
The Japanese government’s immediate response was confused. 
The prime minister, Uno Sōsuke, announced in the parliament that 
the students’ deaths were “unacceptable on humanitarian grounds” 
and that Japan would consider whether to cancel or continue its yen 
loans. In the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, opinion was divided, with 
some believing that Japan should continue to provide yen loans so 
that China would not become isolated and others maintaining that 
Tokyo should follow the lead of the international community. By 
the end of June, the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs had made three dif-
ferent statements about Japan’s intentions.
Dissension between the bureaucrats and the ruling party contin-
ued into the fall. In the ruling LDP, opinion was strongly opposed to 
sanctions. The head of the Japan-China parliamentarians’ league and 
a leading LDP politician, Itō Masayoshi, visited Beijing in Septem-
ber and met with senior Chinese leaders, including Deng Xiaoping. 
Itō argued that Japan’s relationship with China was not the same as 
the U.S. relationship with China and that Japan would not implement 
the sanctions. He also recommended the dispersal of the third yen 
loan to Beijing, ¥810 billion over the ﬁve years from 1990 to 1995. 
But the Ministry of Finance and others were in consultation with 
other nations, and the yen loan was delayed. Japan’s eﬀorts to ﬁnd a 
compromise between the Western nations and China were already 
under way, however. In early November, the Japanese ﬁnance min-
ister announced that China must make an international apology for 
the events at Tiananmen Square before Japan could consider resum-
ing the yen loan.
Domestic interests also strongly favored resuming the loans to 
China. The chairman of Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), Saito 
Eishiro, argued for continued economic support for China despite 
human rights concerns over Tiananmen, and by the end of the year, 
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the minister of foreign aﬀairs, Nakayama Tarō, recommended placing 
priority on helping China succeed with economic reform. For some, 
the idea that Japan should line up with the Western countries on 
sanctioning Beijing was not simply a matter of principle but funda-
mentally impinged on Japan’s interests in China. Gotoda Masaharu, 
a senior LDP leader and vice-chairman of the Japan-China Society, 
argued for resuming the loans in April after the Chinese government 
had lifted martial law. This debate continued in Tokyo through the 
summer as plans for the next G7 Summit meeting in Houston, Texas, 
were being made.
In the end, the special relationship with Beijing weighed heav-
ily on Japanese decision making. Japan’s eﬀort to resolve diﬀerences 
between China and the West came to an end at the G7 meeting in 
the summer of 1990. Japanese diplomats argued for continuing sup-
port for China’s economic development in order to modernize the 
Chinese nation. Yet the prime minister also reminded the United 
States and other nations that Japan’s former prime minister, Takeshita 
Noboru, had made a political commitment to China and that Japan 
had a responsibility to keep its promise. While the United States and 
others continued their economic and military sanctions on China, 
Japan resumed its yen loan on November 2, 1990. Japan’s own inter-
ests in the relationship with China prevailed, but so, too, did the idea 
that in Asia, economic development ought to take precedence over 
political principles. At the beginning of the 1990s, Japan’s leaders were 
still uncomfortable asserting democratic values or advocating on 
behalf of human rights. China’s behavior would test this proposition 
in the decades to come.
Cultivating Economic Interdependence
Beyond these broad geostrategic shifts, the postwar settlement for 
Japan and China largely centered on the economic and cultural ben-
eﬁts of the new relationship. Economic interdependence—and at 
that time the complementarities of the two economies—was seen 
as the salve that would heal the wounds of Japan’s wartime invasion 
and subsequent defeat in 1945. Postwar reconciliation was pursued 
through building strong economic and cultural ties between the 
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Chinese and Japanese people. Japan’s economic ties with China 
were not a product of diplomatic normalization. Indeed, most of the 
groundwork had been laid in the years when there were no oﬃcial 
state ties. A broad array of Japanese sought to develop strong eco-
nomic ties with the Communist Party leadership and state-owned 
enterprises. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949, private business leaders had worked independently and in 
tandem with Japan’s political leaders to commence trade with the 
newly uniﬁed Communist government in Beijing.
This economic relationship was in large part a function of post-
war Japanese domestic politics. Four organizations were formed 
speciﬁcally to enhance trade with China in 1949, and they reveal the 
complexity of Japanese sentiment and interest in the newly emerg-
ing Communist China. Progressive-left groups, small businesses, 
and intellectuals sympathetic to the Chinese revolution formed the 
Japan-China Trade Promotion Association (JCTPA) in May 1949, 
whose stated purpose was to help Chinese industrialization and to 
support the Chinese people. Once the Korean War began and Chinese 
troops crossed the Yalu River, this group’s activities were curtailed, 
and afterward, the JCTPA focused exclusively on trade with China. 
Another trade association, the Japan Association for the Promotion 
of International Trade (JAPIT), emerged to facilitate trade between 
the two Cold War blocs and later included prominent Japanese busi-
ness leaders. The Japan-China Importers and Exporters Association 
(JCIEA) was formed in 1955 with Japanese government support, with 
the purpose of ameliorating the diﬀerences between Japan’s competi-
tive market and Chinese state-owned monopolies. The JCIEA was 
largely the brainchild of the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry (METI) and was designed to harmonize and coordinate 
Japan’s trading relations. Finally, the JCTPA Diet Members League 
was developed to oversee the negotiations and signature of trade 
agreements with China. When it was founded in 1949, the league had 
around ninety members. A decade later, its membership had grown 
to 360, or roughly 50 percent of Japan’s legislators. By the time of nor-
malization, therefore, there was a broad array of knowledge, personal 
ties, and political support for expanding economic relations with the 
People’s Republic of China.
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Once oﬃcial diplomatic ties were restored, the Japanese govern-
ment could step into this established network of economic ties to 
consider how to support China’s long-term economic planning. On 
a visit to China in 1975, Japanese Prime Minister Ōhira Masayoshi 
outlined Japan’s position on providing assistance to China, noting his 
“heartfelt wish that [Japan’s economic assistance] would provide the 
foundation for building the China of the 21st century.” Ōhira cited 
three principles for Japan’s assistance to China: ﬁrst, Japan would not 
provide aid to be used for military purposes, so China would not be 
an exception to that principle; second, Japan’s economic assistance to 
China would not harm the development of any other country in the 
region, particularly the ASEAN countries, with which Japan main-
tained a strong bond; and third, the Japan-China relationship would 
not exclude others. Overseas development assistance (ODA) began 
in earnest in 1979, and four ﬁve-year plans dovetailed with China’s 
economic planning eﬀorts. The Japanese government provided ¥331 
billion in loans from 1979 to 1984, ¥540 billion from 1984 to 1989, ¥810 
billion from 1990 to 1995, and ¥970 billion from 1996 to 2000. In 
total, from 1979 to 2011, Japan provided ¥3.65 trillion (US$37.6 billion) 
in ODA to China, more than 90 percent of which came in the form 
of yen loans.
For decades, such assistance was indispensable to China’s transi-
tion to a market economy, and it was designed to complement Beijing’s 
ﬁve-year development plans. By the 1990s, ODA to China comprised 
roughly 10 to 15 percent of Japan’s total ODA budget, signaling the pri-
ority Japan placed on Chinese economic development. China consis-
tently ranked in the top two destinations of Japanese ODA, while Japan 
was the number-one ODA contributor to China until 2007 and pro-
vided 50 to 60 percent of China’s total incoming assistance for more 
than two decades. China’s economic development, however, gradually 
eliminated the need for Japanese government economic assistance (ﬁg-
ure 2.2). Accordingly, on March 17, 2005, Foreign Minister Machimura 
Nobutaka announced that the yen loans would end by the time of the 
Beijing Olympics in 2008. In April 2007, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
and Prime Minister Abe Shinzō issued a joint statement noting the 
“positive role” these loans had played in China’s economic development, 
and Wen expressed China’s gratitude. The last yen loans to China were 
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FIGURE 2.2 Japan’s oﬃcial development assistance to China. Data is for Japanese 
ﬁscal years (April 1 to March 31). (Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Japan, Kunibetsu enjyo 
jisseki [ODA Results by Country], http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo 
/jisseki/kuni/index.html. Data from Diplomatic Blue Book [1980–1993]; Japan’s ODA 
Annual Report [1994–1999]; and Japan’s ODA White Paper [2001–2012])
disbursed in December 2007, and when President Hu Jintao visited 
Tokyo in May 2008, he told Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo that “the 
Japanese government and people, through ODA, have supported the 
modernization of China, and for this I give my heartfelt thanks.”
As ODA wound down, trade between Japan and China began to 
take oﬀ (ﬁgure 2.3). Accordingly, the Japanese government turned its 
attention from China’s economic development toward the resolution 
of trade disputes. Along with other nations, Tokyo granted Beijing 
most-favored-nation (MFN) status in 1974 as part of the normaliza-
tion process. The rapid growth of Chinese imports into the Japanese 
market in the 1990s, however, created a stream of trade disputes. By 
the mid-1990s, the Japanese government was increasingly under pres-
sure from domestic producers to prevent Chinese competition in the 
domestic market. Chinese textiles occupied more than 50 percent of 
the Japanese market, and Japanese producers demanded import pro-
tections. Likewise, agricultural imports from China were rising sig-
niﬁcantly, prompting Japanese farmers to demand safeguards as well. 
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Garlic, ginger, green onions, shiitake mushrooms, and tatami straw 
were just some of the products imported from China that threatened 
Japanese producers.
China’s acceptance into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
September 2001 changed the management of trade disputes from 
bilateral negotiation to third-party adjudication. China had consis-
tently imposed high tariﬀs on imports from Japan. In 2001, it imposed 
punitive tariﬀs on Japanese autos and cell phone exports, and Nak-
agawa Shōichi, head of a LDP special task force on agriculture and 
trade, announced that Japan would seek WTO adjudication. The 
two governments settled the issue through bilateral negotiation, and 
China lowered the tariﬀs. Nonetheless, Japanese exports continued 
to be subjected to Chinese tariﬀ protection. In 2004, Chinese tariﬀs 
on foreign semiconductors prompted a serious trade dispute with the 
United States. Japan again began to consider WTO adjudication, but 
the United States and China settled their dispute in July 2004, lead-
ing the way for a similar resolution for Japan. Eventually, however, 
Japan relied on the WTO dispute resolution mechanism to cope with 
its disputes with China, and it did so along with the United States 
FIGURE 2.3 Japan’s trade with China, 1993–2013. (Ministry of Finance, Japan, 
“Trade Statistics of Japan,” http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index_e.htm)
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and the European Union. In 2006, these three parties initiated a 
complaint and asked for WTO adjudication over China’s violation of 
intellectual property rights. In 2010, China’s export restrictions of 
rare earths led Japan to consider similar steps under the WTO, and 
when export restrictions resulted in a global price increase the fol-
lowing year, Japan initiated consultations with the United States and 
the European Union, and the three parties ﬁled a WTO complaint in 
March 2012.
As the Chinese economy grew, Japan’s private investors took on 
a much larger role in the countries’ bilateral economic cooperation. 
For the private sector, the pace of investment in China depended in 
large part on the development of China’s industry. Japan’s businesses 
were chastened by China’s inability to follow through on early proj-
ects. The ﬁrst trade agreement negotiated in 1978 by Inayama Yoshi-
hiro, chairman of Nippon Steel and head of the Japan-China Business 
Association, and supported by the Japanese government, was ambi-
tious—with a goal of Japanese and Chinese exports of $10 billion in 
the ﬁrst decade, which was then amended to double or triple that 
scale. Japanese companies were contracted to build plants and com-
plete other development projects as Japan began to provide yen loans 
to support Beijing’s development. A transition in China’s leadership, 
however, led to a revision of former premier Hua Guofeng’s Ten-Year 
Plan (1976–1985), and Beijing abruptly reduced or canceled Japa-
nese contracts. One of the most symbolic was the cancellation of the 
Baoshan steel complex, a huge initiative worth ¥398 billion in 1981.
Over the years, Japanese companies continued to be wary of 
China’s economic decision making, but by the early 1990s, Japanese 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Chinese economy had taken oﬀ 
(ﬁgure 2.4). Along with Taiwanese and Hong Kong–based investors, 
Japanese investors were the biggest supporters of Chinese economic 
transformation and played a critical role in shaping Chinese market 
reforms. Japanese automakers and other manufacturers led the way 
in investing in China and, by the end of the 1990s, were concentrating 
on producing for the burgeoning Chinese consumer market. Over 
time, FDI from Japan ﬂuctuated, which is attributed to various fac-
tors. Yen appreciation as well as other market forces aﬀected FDI 
trends, as well as Beijing’s own economic decisions. Increasingly, 
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however, it was the incentives of the China market that became the 
dominant driver of Japanese corporate investment decisions.
The Limits of Reconciliation Diplomacy
The emphasis on economic cooperation did not diminish the need for 
political attention to Chinese memories of Japan’s invasion of China. 
There was no Chinese demand for compensation by Japan for war 
damages during treaty negotiations because Mao Zedong and oth-
ers had decided against them, but the decision continued to be con-
troversial. Japan refused as well to characterize its postnormalization 
economic aid to China as compensation for its invasion and pointed 
to both the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Japan’s normalization 
of relations with the Republic of China as providing the legal basis 
for the postwar settlement. Yet the impression that postwar Japanese 
FIGURE 2.4 Japan’s foreign direct investment in China, 1992–2013. (Ministry of 
Finance, Japan, “Foreign Direct Investment,” https://www.mof.go.jp/english/interna-
tional_policy/reference/itn_transactions_in_securities/fdi/index.htm [1992–2004]; 
“Outward/Inward Direct Investment,” https://www.mof.go.jp/english/international 
_policy/reference/balance_of_payments/ebpfdi.htm [2005–2013])
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support for Chinese modernization took the place of war damages 
lingered. Chinese leaders reinforced this notion when tensions arose 
over the terms of Japan’s yen loans to China. While the Chinese lead-
ers who had negotiated the terms of postwar peace with Japan found 
it expedient to forgo reparations, their successors did not feel con-
strained in reminding Japan of the price China had paid for Japan’s 
military expansion. Moreover, Chinese citizens, in collaboration with 
Japanese legal teams and citizen activists, began to use the courts to 
sue the Japanese government for redress.
In the 1980s, open Chinese criticism of Japanese interpretation of 
twentieth-century history, especially of the Japanese military’s conduct 
during the war, began to color the relationship. In 1982, the Asahi shin-
bun published an exposé of the Ministry of Education’s eﬀorts to rewrite 
Japanese textbooks. The series prompted a political clash between Japan’s 
conservatives, who wanted the textbooks to have a stronger “patriotic” 
message, and liberal educators and authors, who sought to portray 
the suﬀering caused by Japan’s aggression. Prime Minister Nakasone 
Yasuhiro’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 drew especially strongly 
criticism from China. As a result, Nakasone decided to forgo an appear-
ance at the controversial shrine the following year. From this point 
onward, Japanese statements of remorse or regret for the suﬀering of 
the Chinese people became an integral part of bilateral diplomacy.
High-level state visits provided an occasion for Japanese state-
ments of remorse and a new diplomatic focus on historical recon-
ciliation. Chinese concerns over Japan’s “militarism” were put on the 
back burner, however, when Chinese tanks confronted demonstrators 
in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. Although Japan halted negotia-
tions on its next ﬁve-year yen loan (for ﬁscal years 1990 to 1995), it 
played an instrumental role in mitigating calls for sanctions of China 
by the United States and Europe over Chinese repression. The idea 
of a high-level state visit to China had been introduced in April that 
year, when Chinese premier Li Peng raised the possibility of a visit to 
China by the Japanese emperor. A year later, Japan had yet to resume 
talks over economic assistance, and General Secretary Jiang Zemin 
urged that negotiations over the yen loans begin again, stating the 
importance to China of good relations with Japan. By the summer, 
Jiang said that he would welcome the emperor if he wished to visit 
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China, although he noted that the Chinese people could not forget 
the history of Japanese aggression. The Japanese government’s deci-
sion to resume yen loans to China was announced at the Houston G8 
summit in July 1990. The next year, senior Chinese oﬃcials repeat-
edly asked that the Japanese emperor visit China in 1992 for the twen-
tieth anniversary of Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.
Initially, Japanese feelings about the emperor’s visit were mixed. 
The question of how he would be received in China, of course, 
remained sensitive. In February 1992, China’s ambassador to Japan 
sought to reassure the Japanese by holding a press conference at 
the National Press Club in Tokyo. Ambassador Yang Zhenya noted 
that the anticipated visit to China by Japan’s emperor would be “a 
historic achievement” that would take the bilateral relationship to 
a “new level.” The ambassador went on to say, “China is a civilized 
country, and would never do anything to trouble a foreign leader,” 
yet he thought it “would seem natural for both Japanese and Chi-
nese that the Emperor express his attitude on the unfortunate history 
of a particular moment in the two countries’ relations.” In March, 
Premier Li introduced the possibility to his own people in a public 
speech when he pointed out the importance of visits by the “highest 
state leaders” of Japan and China. By the summer of 1992, popular 
Japanese reservations seemed to have been overcome. A public poll 
by the Nikkei shinbun revealed that around 70 percent of Japanese 
supported the emperor’s visit to China, and only 17.7 percent opposed 
it. On August 25, the Japanese cabinet approved the visit.
The Japanese emperor and empress traveled to China in late Octo-
ber 1992. After a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People, 
China’s President Yang Shangkun met with the imperial couple and 
then hosted a state dinner. There, the emperor spoke ﬁrst about the 
long history of relations between Japan and China, dating back to the 
exchange of emissaries from the eighth to the ninth centuries, includ-
ing the young Japanese sent to China to study who later returned to 
share their knowledge of Chinese culture with Japan. He pointed to 
the long history of Japan’s great respect for Chinese culture and expe-
rience and praised the contemporary youth exchange programs that 
brought young Chinese to Japan for study as well. But the emperor 
then turned to the topic of Japan’s war with China. Referring to the 
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“unfortunate era when our country [Japan] caused immense pain 
and suﬀering to the Chinese people,” the emperor spoke of the “deep 
sadness” this period caused him; he went on to say that the Japa-
nese people had rebuilt their nation determined never again to wage 
war and to live in peace with other nations. The emperor toured 
China, visiting the Great Wall, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
the National Palace Museum, and to Shaanxi, Shanghai, and Xihu. 
Overall, the visit was a success, and public reaction in both countries 
seemed positive.
It took another six years, however, for the Chinese to reciprocate 
the emperor’s state visit. Finally, in November 1998, Chinese president 
Jiang Zemin visited Japan, the ﬁrst Chinese president to ever do so. 
Unlike the emperor’s visit to China, however, this visit did not encour-
age greater Japanese support for the relationship with China. Instead, 
it provoked a sharp decline in popular attitudes toward China and 
accelerated the diminishing public support for the Chinese govern-
ment in particular. Like the Japanese emperor’s visit, the ﬁve-day visit 
included political meetings, visits to factories and farms to reﬂect the 
evolving Japan-China economic interests, and, of course, meetings 
with Chinese residents and Japanese students.
But the visit began badly. At the state dinner hosted by the 
emperor and empress of Japan, President Jiang delivered a scold-
ing for Japan’s wrongdoing in the war. His speech was televised to 
the nation, and for many Japanese, both the tone and the fact that 
it was delivered publicly to the emperor were extremely oﬀensive. 
Although Jiang remained in Japan for another three days, the Japa-
nese public saw very little of him on television. At the end of his 
stay, the diplomats issued a joint statement outlining an agenda for 
Japan-China cooperation, but the legacy of Jiang’s trip cast a pall 
over the bilateral relationship for some time afterward. The shock 
of his speech at the state dinner may have been ampliﬁed by the 
contrast with the conciliatory tone of a speech given just a month 
earlier by the South Korean president, Kim Dae-Jung. President 
Kim had taken a very diﬀerent tack, seeking to embed the painful 
Japanese colonization of his country in the twentieth century in a 
broader sweep of centuries of shared history. Looking back, the 1998 
state visit by President Jiang marked the beginning of a decade of 
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repeated tensions between Japan and China and a diplomatic “deep 
freeze” in the Japan-China relationship.
The Taiwan Straits Crisis
New concerns in Japan about China’s growing role in regional security 
arose after the Cold War ended. The 1990s brought a series of crises in 
Northeast Asia involving the United States and its allies. The ﬁrst was 
the nuclear crisis of 1993/1994 with North Korea, which ushered in 
decades of regional debate over how to respond to Pyongyang’s pro-
liferation of nuclear and missile capabilities. China’s role in sponsor-
ing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions was suspect, but the crisis that 
most focused Japan’s attention on China’s impact on regional security 
was the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis. Calls for declaring independence 
accompanied the election campaign for president in March 1996. The 
new Democratic People’s Party (DPP), led by Chen Shui-bian, criti-
cized the Guomindang for its continued hesitation to pursue sover-
eignty for Taiwan. Beijing became increasingly concerned about the 
impact the electoral campaign would have on the “one China” policy, 
and its opposition to a declaration of independence grew. In July 1995, 
China even moved missiles for use against Taiwan, threatening force 
should it declare independence. The Clinton administration reacted 
by sending a carrier task force to the straits to demonstrate U.S. sup-
port for the defense of Taiwan. The standoﬀ between Beijing and Tai-
bei was ultimately defused, but China’s willingness to use force over 
Taiwan reminded Tokyo that the Korean Peninsula was not the only 
ﬂashpoint in Northeast Asia.
Moreover, this incident also demonstrated the region’s changing 
military balance. Although Japan’s security was not directly threat-
ened by either crisis, these regional tensions did raise new questions 
about Japan’s military preparedness and its ability to cooperate with 
its ally, the United States, in managing the region’s security. China was 
enhancing its military capability, and several aspects of China’s mili-
tary growth concerned Japanese security planners. First, the modern-
ization of China’s nuclear force challenged the extended deterrence of 
U.S. strategic forces as the greater number of nuclear warheads avail-
able to Beijing raised the stakes in the region. In fact, the Japanese 
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concern about China’s nuclear modernization was suﬃcient to war-
rant a halt to ODA when China insisted on testing its nuclear weap-
ons. Two nuclear tests conducted in 1995, one in May and the other in 
August, drew a Japanese response. In August 1995, Japan cut oﬀ most 
of its grant aid to China, with payments shrinking from ¥7.79 billion 
in ﬁscal year 1994 to ¥480 million in ﬁscal year 1995.
Second, Beijing’s reaction to Taiwan’s independence movement 
alarmed Tokyo about Chinese intentions in the region. In the early 
years of the Cold War, of course, Beijing had confronted the Guomin-
dang regime in Taibei, and both times Washington had responded. 
These early Taiwan Straits crises preceded normalization, however, 
and thus the 1996 crisis tested not only the U.S. commitment to Tai-
wan’s defense but also the premise of the “one China” policy that had 
accompanied diplomatic relations with the PRC. China’s growing 
military capabilities, including the modernization of its nuclear arse-
nal, raised the stakes for both Washington and Beijing’s neighbors. 
The costs for extending deterrence to Taiwan were mounting, and 
the beneﬁts to the United States of its relationship with Beijing could 
be leveraged far diﬀerently than in the 1950s. For Japanese strategic 
planners, the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis was not only the ﬁrst indica-
tion that Beijing would use force if political change on Taiwan proved 
inimical to PRC interests; it was also the ﬁrst open test of how U.S. 
defense commitments in Northeast Asia would fare against China’s 
burgeoning military power. The 1996 Ministry of Defense White 
Paper noted what became the chief analytical concern in Tokyo, the 
shift from “quantitative” enhancements of China’s military capability 
to “qualitative” improvements in its ability to use that military.
Finally, by the end of the decade, Beijing’s enhanced maritime 
power in and around the East China Sea made it clear to Tokyo that 
its southwestern region was inadequately defended. For most of the 
Cold War, Japanese military forces had been concentrated in the 
north; and in the 1980s as the eﬀort to pressure the Soviet Union’s 
Paciﬁc Fleet intensiﬁed, Japan’s defense of its northern waters around 
Hokkaido, as well as its Maritime Self-Defense Force deployments in 
the Western Paciﬁc, played an important role in bottling up the Sovi-
ets’ strategic naval forces. Throughout the Cold War, it was the U.S. 
military forces in Okinawa that played the dominant role in defending 
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Japan’s southern islands. When Chinese air and maritime forces 
started concentrating on the East China Sea, however, Tokyo began 
to recognize the inadequacy of its own forces in the southwest.
The North Korean and Taiwan crises brought new questions about 
Japan’s military preparedness, and Washington grew more and more 
concerned about the lack of serious contingency planning in the U.S.-
Japan alliance. Because of the constraints of the Japanese constitution, 
the U.S. and Japanese militaries had no integrated war plans. Unlike 
NATO and the U.S.-South Korean alliance, there was no provision for a 
joint command. In fact, beyond a series of exercises between U.S. Forces 
Japan and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, there had been little concrete 
exploration of how the two militaries might operate together in case of a 
conﬂict or crisis. A bilateral study group on updating alliance prepared-
ness began shortly after the Taiwan Straits crisis in an eﬀort to redress 
these challenges. A similar policy discussion initiated by the Japanese 
government in 1978 had produced the ﬁrst Guidelines for U.S.-Japan 
Defense Cooperation, which described the roles and missions for the two 
militaries in defending Japan. As security tensions increased in North-
east Asia in the 1990s, the Japanese and U.S. governments recognized the 
need for an overhaul of these military guidelines for the alliance.
Japan’s long-standing limitations on its military were revisited 
largely in response to the worrisome situation on the Korean Penin-
sula. Yet Japanese planners recognized that China could pose an even 
greater strategic challenge to Japan’s defensive force posture. From a 
broader perspective, drawing the United States more closely into plan-
ning for Northeast Asian contingencies made more sense than deal-
ing solely with Pyongyang. Thereafter, the focus of the Japanese eﬀort 
to reconsider the parameters of allied cooperation was on “areas sur-
rounding Japan” (shūhen jitai). The Taiwan Straits crisis thus provided 
both the impetus for Japan to accelerate deliberations with Washington 
on the guidelines as well as the political stimulus needed to pass leg-
islation supporting the alliance’s new agenda for military cooperation. 
In 1997, Tokyo and Washington concluded their talks and announced 
the revised U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation.
Tokyo remained sensitive to Beijing’s perceptions of the U.S.-
Japan alliance, however. Media reports at the time suggested con-
siderable diﬀerences in the interpretation of Japan’s reasons for 
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revising the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines. The LDP’s 
secretary-general, Katō Kōichi, visited Beijing in July 1997 and met 
with Chinese leaders, including future president Hu Jintao as well as 
the defense minister and the vice-minister of foreign aﬀairs. In his 
meetings, Katō reportedly emphasized that the guidelines were not 
revised with China in mind; rather, they were aimed primarily at the 
Korean Peninsula. But a month later the chief cabinet secretary, 
Kajiyama Seiroku, openly refuted this notion during an interview 
with TV Asahi. Although Katō’s comments had prompted quite a stir 
and some public criticism, Kajiyama clearly stated that the govern-
ment’s interpretation of “areas surrounding Japan” was not limited 
to any one geographical contingency and that “of course, a conﬂict 
between China and Taiwan would be a scenario considered within 
the guidelines.” In fact, he argued that limiting the guidelines to the 
Korean Peninsula eﬀectively limited the U.S.-Japan alliance and that 
while the Japanese government had no intention of intervening in 
domestic aﬀairs, it had serious concerns about China’s use of force 
against Taiwan.
As the domestic debate over the U.S.-Japan Defense Coopera-
tion Guidelines continued, North Korea tested a new, intermedi-
ate-range ballistic missile, which passed over Japan. The launch of 
the Taepodong in September 1998 startled the Japanese public and 
prompted a renewed debate over Japan’s defenses. While politicians 
pressed for greater independent intelligence-gathering capability, Jap-
anese security planners called for U.S.-Japan cooperation on a ballistic 
missile defense system. Missile defense had been a topic of discus-
sion between Tokyo and Washington ever since the Reagan admin-
istration’s emphasis on the development of a “Star Wars” space-based 
defense system, but the North Korean launch brought home in a very 
conspicuous way Japan’s vulnerability to a such an attack. Even those 
who had opposed the high-tech weapons system proposed by the 
U.S. government in the 1980s understood that Japan was now facing 
neighbors with a growing ballistic missile capability. Of course, Bei-
jing’s nuclear arsenal remained a concern, but the openly hostile North 
Korean government persuaded many Japanese that the time had come 
to take steps to defend Japan also against long-range missiles.
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In 1999, China emerged front and center as parliamentary debate 
over the legislation to implement the revised U.S.-Japan Guidelines 
continued. A special committee on the U.S.-Japan Defense Guide-
lines heard testimony from a variety of experts, with a range of views 
on whether a Taiwan contingency should be included as part of bilat-
eral military planning. Those who argued for its inclusion empha-
sized the impact of a Taiwan contingency on Japanese security, and 
those who argued against it concentrated instead on Taiwan’s special 
relationship with China. Japan’s foreign minister, Kōmura Masahiko, 
and its defense minister, Norota Hosei, continued to insist that “areas 
surrounding Japan” was not a geographical but a situational concept. 
In eﬀect, the government of Japan refused to accept any limitation 
on the alliance’s military cooperation. Three laws were amended in 
accordance with the revision of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines. The most 
important, the Law on Contingencies Surrounding Japan (Shūhen 
jitai anzen kakuho ho), allowed Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to act 
with the United States, including rear-area support and search-and-
rescue operations, before parliamentary approval, if needed.
Japan’s role in Asia Paciﬁc regionalism also underwent a transfor-
mation in the 1990s. Its economic leadership in the region was unmis-
takable, as both the engine of growth for other Asian economies and 
the lead voice in the regional economic consultations for the Asia-
Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation/Commission (APEC). In 1992, the 
Japanese government strongly supported ASEAN’s eﬀort to create a 
regional security mechanism that would bring together the countries 
of the region to consider security issues. Regional multilateralism 
centered on ASEAN, which was initially sponsored and encouraged 
by Tokyo, a decade later became a new venue for the assertion of Chi-
nese inﬂuence.
THE CHANGING BALANCE OF ADVOCACY ON CHINA
As Japan’s government agencies began to contend with the various 
policy adjustments needed to cope with China’s economic and mil-
itary growth, the domestic debate over Japan’s foreign policy goals 
showed signs of change as well.
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For much of the postwar period, Japan’s China policy seemed 
to be predominantly in the hands of politicians and business elite. 
But Japan’s political parties took center stage in the debate over 
normalization. Japan’s conservatives in the Liberal Democratic Party 
were divided over the terms of the peace treaty, with the pro-Taiwan 
conservatives tempering those in the party who advocated normal-
ization with Beijing. In the years after the peace treaty, the party also 
divided over the terms of Japanese reconciliation diplomacy. Among 
opposition parties, the Japanese Socialist Party was the staunchest 
advocate of close ties between Beijing and Tokyo, and the Buddhist-
based Kōmeitō (Clean Government Party), which emerged in the 
1970s, also was strongly pro-Beijing. Both these parties were ada-
mantly supportive of Japan’s paciﬁst constitution and reconciliation 
with China. The second inﬂuence on Japan’s relations with China was 
Japan’s business elite. Despite some setbacks in its economic ties with 
China, Japan’s corporate leaders welcomed the economic beneﬁts to 
Japan that accrued from friendly relations and therefore consistently 
argued for close diplomatic ties.
Over time, domestic interests changed, and policy seemed moti-
vated less by ideological positions or commercial interests. As China 
increasingly complicated Japanese interests. The standoﬀ between 
the progressive left’s sympathy for Beijing and the conservative right’s 
skepticism of its Communist government gradually gave way to a 
broader consensus on the importance of China to Japanese policy 
management. Liberals and conservatives alike recognized the impor-
tance of China to Japan’s future, although the former were more 
inclined toward a cooperative approach embedded in regionalism 
and the latter sought to explore ways to balance Chinese inﬂuence 
with greater U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation.
During the 1990s, outside political circles, the constellations of 
interests that coalesced around China policy also began to change, 
as did popular attitudes toward China, creating opportunity for new 
advocacies and more complex views of China. Virulent nationalists, 
a minority but a threatening voice in Japan’s debate, began criticizing 
the country’s reconciliation diplomacy. Perhaps the most conspicu-
ous consequence was the hesitation of Japan’s business community 
to push for a more cooperative relationship with China. Even though 
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their business interests did not necessarily change as China’s economy 
grew, domestic skepticism of Chinese intentions made advocacy 
more politically sensitive and, for some outspoken business leaders, 
drew the unwanted attention of Japan’s rightists.
Politicians, Reform, and China Policy
Political reform in Tokyo has greatly aﬀected Japan’s diplomacy, 
including its relationship with China. The conservative Liberal Dem-
ocratic Party (LDP) lost its ability to command a majority in the 
House of Representatives in 1993 when Ozawa Ichirō left the party. 
Japan’s postwar single-party dominance, established when the LDP 
took power in 1955, was over, and coalition governments returned 
to govern Japan. As Japan’s policymakers became concerned about 
the strategic challenge of China, Japan’s politicians were demanding 
a greater voice in policymaking. Throughout the 1990s, the ﬂuidity of 
Japanese politics made it diﬃcult to focus on China’s rise, as atten-
tion remained riveted on the personalities and ambitions of Japan’s 
political elite.
Nonetheless, Japan’s political change began to create the founda-
tion for a less ideologically informed debate over China policy. China 
policy had been a long-standing bone of contention in the divide 
between the left and the right in Japan’s 1955 system. The progres-
sive left, represented most vocally by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 
recommended reconciliation with Beijing and a lessening of Japan’s 
reliance on Washington. The staunchly anti-Communist LDP, in con-
trast, had advocated a close alliance with the United States during 
the Cold War and resisted the notion that Japan owed China further 
apology for World War II. Granted, in the LDP there was a range of 
opinion on just how much Japan should accommodate Beijing, and 
many were suspicious of the Chinese Communist Party and its ambi-
tions in Asia. Others in the LDP, such as Katō Kōichi, were more 
comfortable with the reconciliation eﬀort and the need for Japan to 
acknowledge wrongdoing in the years leading up to the invasion of 
China and during the war.
The most dramatic evidence of a blurring of postwar ideological 
divisions was the coalition formed in 1995 between the LDP and the 
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JSP that brought a socialist party legislator into the prime minis-
ter’s oﬃce. Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi argued strongly for 
reconciliation with China and South Korea, and it was he who crafted 
the most direct government statement of Japan’s responsibility for the 
war against China:
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, fol-
lowing a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to 
war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, 
through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous 
damage and suﬀering to the people of many countries, particu-
larly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake 
be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irre-
futable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings 
of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also 
to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, 
both at home and abroad, of that history.
This 1995 statement of apology remains in force today as state pol-
icy, and both conservative and liberal prime ministers since have 
endorsed it as the oﬃcial Japanese apology for its wartime aggres-
sion. Yet this formal apology to China did not prove to be a grand 
resolution for the tensions between Beijing and Tokyo, and did 
not prevent Chinese president Jiang Zemin three years later from 
delivering his scalding remarks to the emperor about Japan’s lack 
of remorse.
The ﬁve-year tenure of Koizumi Jun’ichirō as prime minister 
(2001–2006) was characterized by a series of tensions with China 
and outbursts of Chinese citizen activism against Japanese interests. 
While Koizumi was seen as the catalyst for some of the more con-
tentious disputes with Beijing, his successors confronted some of the 
same issues and also had mixed results in their eﬀorts to build a more 
positive relationship with Beijing. Three of the prime ministers after 
Koizumi—Abe Shinzō, Fukuda Yasuo, and Asō Tarō—worked hard to 
mend relations with China, and all were conservative LDP politicians.
The government’s ability to negotiate these new inﬂuences ema-
nating from China, to shape their impact on Japanese citizens, and 
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to accommodate the growth of China’s regional and global power 
is therefore being aﬀected by not only China’s behavior but also the 
reactions from Japan that are inﬂuencing the policymaking process. 
A careful examination of critical episodes of contention between 
Japan and China over the past decade reveals a more complex array 
of interests engaged in forming Japan’s China policies than in the 
past. The pro-China groups in business and in politics still exist, as 
do the anti-China advocates, individuals, and organized interests. But 
as diplomats and politicians try to craft a new vision for cooperation 
that accommodates China’s growing strategic inﬂuence, Japan’s pub-
lic remains more and more skeptical of the idea of partnering with 
the current Chinese leadership.
Both China’s choices and Japan’s own policies helped determine 
Japanese attitudes toward the Sino-Japanese relationship. More and 
more Japanese focused on their economic woes and the Japanese 
government’s inability to protect their interests. That is, Japan’s vul-
nerabilities were becoming a source of domestic frustration just as 
the government was trying to adapt to China’s changing inﬂuence on 
Japanese society.
The Limits of Business Advocacy
Japan’s private sector, as well, has played a central role in postwar rela-
tions with China and has, for the most part, consistently supported 
maintaining close relations with Beijing. Both of Japan’s major cor-
porate associations, the Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) and 
the Keizai dōyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives), fre-
quently analyze and advocate on behalf of business interests in China. 
Individual ﬁrms also have a voice in Japan’s understanding of China’s 
rise, and trading companies as well as Japanese manufacturing com-
panies are broadly exposed in the Chinese market.
Political leaders often turn to leading businessmen to help improve 
relations with Beijing, especially when issues involving historical mem-
ory provoke controversy in the relationship. In 2003, for example, the 
Koizumi cabinet turned to Kobayashi Yotaro, chairman of Fuji Xerox 
and an executive of the Keizai dōyukai, to lead a new initiative for a 
more positive relationship with China. The Twenty-First-Century 
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Japan-China Friendship Commission was established in 2003 by 
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and Chinese President Hu and 
presented its report to both governments in 2008. Tensions over Koi-
zumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine prompted this outreach eﬀort by 
nongovernmental experts in Japan and China, and even though the 
binational friendship commission concentrated on supporting the 
oﬃcial diplomatic relationship, it could not ﬁnish its report and pol-
icy recommendations until after the Koizumi cabinet had left oﬃce. 
Other Japanese business leaders were tapped to assist the Japanese 
government in facilitating oﬃcial diplomatic relations. A more recent 
example was the appointment by the new DPJ government in 2010 
of the Itōchū Corporation’s chief executive oﬃcer, Niwa Uichirō, as 
ambassador to Beijing.
Despite Japan’s deep economic interests in China, its business lead-
ers’ views on how to manage political tensions between Japan and 
China have not been uniﬁed. Business leaders worried about the 
impact of Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni on the country’s relations with 
China and so tried to mitigate their impact. The Keidanren’s chair-
man, Imai Takashi, former head of Nippon Steel, joined the political 
eﬀort to craft an alternative memorial to Yasukuni. Toyota Motor 
Corporation’s chairman, Okuda Hiroshi, who succeeded Imai at the 
Keidanren, openly expressed his concerns over the visits and urged 
Koizumi to reconsider. Moreover, Okuda was widely recognized as 
one of the most signiﬁcant interlocutors between Hu and Koizumi, 
repeatedly traveling to Beijing to meet with Hu during the troubled 
years of the relationship. Nonetheless, Okuda’s successor, Mitarai 
Fujio of Canon, took a diﬀerent tack and instead, Mitarai publicly 
echoed Koizumi’s interpretation that Yasukuni was a “political issue,” 
implying that business leaders should stay out of it.
The Keizai dōyukai, in contrast, consistently and openly opposed 
Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits. In a well-known exchange via press confer-
ences, the head of the Keizai dōyukai, Kitashiro Kakutaro, and Prime 
Minister Koizumi disagreed publicly on advocacy by business lead-
ers on political matters. On May 9, 2006, the Keizai dōyukai pub-
lished a proposal for Japan-China relations, and its chairman openly 
urged Japan’s prime minister to forgo his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
Kitashiro argued that for the sake of the nation’s security, there should 
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be no antipathy between the people of Japan and China. But Prime 
Minister Koizumi, following up in his press conference, adamantly 
disputed Kitashiro’s logic, dismissing the business leaders’ report by 
quipping, “Politics is diﬀerent from business.”
Prominent business leaders’ advocacy of better ties with China has 
resulted in drawing attention and even threats from marginal right-
wing groups that champion the cause of Japanese nationalism. After 
Kobayashi, head of the Twenty-First-Century Japan-China Friend-
ship Commission, voiced his view in September 2004 that the prime 
minister should not oﬀend the feelings of the Chinese people by vis-
iting the Yasukuni Shrine, right-wing activists gathered regularly in 
front of his Tokyo home that fall. In January 2005, the remains of 
two Molotov cocktails were found there, and police investigating the 
arson attributed it to right-wing activists. On January 19, Kobayashi 
received a letter with a bullet inside, which prompted a concerted 
response by Japan’s business elite. Keidanren Chairman Okuda 
stated, “These acts of terrorism are wrong. If these continue, we can-
not comment on political matters.”
A diﬀerent kind of political pressure was placed on Ambassador 
Niwa Uichirō, the former chairman of Itōchu Corporation who was 
sent to Beijing in 2010 by the DPJ government. When the island dis-
pute erupted more vehemently in 2012, Niwa gave an interview to 
the London-based Financial Times, speaking out about the Tokyo 
municipal governor’s plans to purchase the Senkaku Islands. He 
warned that Ishihara’s plans could spark an “extremely grave cri-
sis” between Japan and China that would aﬀect business ties. The 
Noda government came under immediate ﬁre from the Japanese 
media, and Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu stated that 
the ambassador was expressing his own “personal view” rather 
than the government’s position. Foreign Minister Genba Kōichiro 
admonished Niwa in writing the same day. For its part, the LDP 
criticized Niwa and demanded his immediate resignation. Need-
less to say, Governor Ishihara echoed the criticism of Niwa’s com-
ments, stating that he “was not fulﬁlling his role of ambassador.” 
At the end of that year, after his retirement, Niwa granted an inter-
view to the Asahi shinbun, stating that Governor Ishihara’s plans 
included building a bridge to one of the islands, and he wanted to 
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warn the Japanese government that there would be severe conse-
quences if this was done. That Niwa felt he had to communicate 
with Tokyo via the Financial Times reveals his isolation in the gov-
ernment and also the diﬃculty of managing this intense domestic 
political pressure.
Nationalist Activists
On the opposite side of the China debate from Japan’s business com-
munity were the conservative nationalists who wanted a more dis-
tant and less interdependent national stance toward China. Many of 
these individuals were anti-Communist and hostile to the Chinese 
Communist Party, but some simply wanted a more autonomous 
Japan and chafed at the notion of kowtowing to China. In addition, 
a small, but dangerous, group of anti-China right wingers in Japan 
have been known to use intimidation and, at times, violence against 
those whom they perceive as too subservient to “foreign” inﬂuence. 
Indeed, as noted earlier, several leaders—including both politicians 
and business executives—who advocated for closer cooperation and 
compromise with China found themselves on the receiving end of 
bomb threats and actual physical attacks.
Besides warnings to and, at times, coercive pressure on Japan’s 
business leaders, marginal right-wing activists turned their attention 
to those political leaders who were openly supportive of close rela-
tions with China. The most dramatic example of this kind of vio-
lence was the August 15, 2006, arson attacks on the home and oﬃce of 
Katō Kōichi, the former LDP secretary-general, in his home district 
in Yamagata Prefecture. On August 29, the Yamagata police arrested 
Horikome Masahiro (age sixty-ﬁve), who had been found outside 
the burning house with self-inﬂicted stab wounds to his stomach. 
He confessed to the crime. Horikome was a member of two fringe 
right-wing organizations, one of which—the Dainihon dōhōsha—
was involved in Senkaku Island activism. After his arrest, however, 
the leader of Dainihon dōhōsha claimed that Horikome’s actions had 
nothing to do with his organization’s philosophy and mission and 
that he had acted alone. This incident ﬁnally led Prime Minister 
Koizumi to condemn acts of violence and the use of terror to shut 
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down speech, but at the same time he criticized Japan’s media for 
whipping up nationalist sentiments.
Beyond these marginal activists are new nationalist advocates 
who are frustrated with the Chinese government and with what they 
perceive is the Japanese government’s inability to defend Japanese 
interests. In this group are politicians, writers, and other public ﬁg-
ures who mobilize demonstrations or speak out in media venues such 
as Channel Sakura or on blogs that press for a more confrontational 
approach to China’s encroachment on Japanese interests. These 
newer anti-China nationalists tend to focus on Japan’s weakness in 
the face of Chinese behavior, and the roots of their activism lie in the 
tensions between Japan and China over historical issues and defense. 
Japan’s political change has also given greater opportunity to these 
conservative nationalists. Yet on China policy, they have been equally 
critical of conservative LDP cabinets as they have been of the more 
recent reformist DPJ governments. The growing use of the media by 
Japan’s politicians, including social media like Twitter, has allowed 
individual politicians with nationalist sympathies to join these new 
activists. Channel Sakura regularly features Diet members, and indi-
vidual politicians use their blogs and Twitter accounts to add to the 
ﬂurry of anti-China commentary online.
Hardening Public Attitudes Toward China
Besides those groups that have long stood on opposite sides of Japan’s 
China debate, popular feelings about Japan’s relations with China 
have become increasingly important to the policy debate. As frictions 
over Chinese actions or practices have heated up over the past decade, 
more and more Japanese have become aware of the ways in which 
China is aﬀecting their lives, and their perceptions of this country are 
closely tied to their conﬁdence in their own government’s ability to 
defend their interests.
Over the past decade, pollsters have carefully monitored pub-
lic concerns about China. The conclusion is striking: Japanese atti-
tudes toward China have become increasingly suspicious and 
negative. According to Genron NPO, a nonproﬁt organization that 
tracked public attitudes in Japan and China in cooperation with the 
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China Daily from 2005 to 2013, the percentage of Japanese who said 
they had a negative attitude toward China more than doubled, from 
37.9 percent to 90.1 percent. Chinese attitudes toward Japan, too, have 
become less and less positive, dipping sharply in 2012/2013 when neg-
ative feelings toward Japan jumped from 64.5 percent in June 2012 to 
92.8 percent in August 2013, a disquieting trend.
Japanese public opinion has also been skeptical of the rewards 
of Tokyo’s diplomacy with Beijing. For example, in 2008, more than 
half the Japanese respondents claimed that they had not changed 
their negative perceptions of China, despite the active diplomacy 
between Beijing and Tokyo designed to improve relations. The rea-
sons for their distrust of China seem to be based on a loss of faith in 
the Chinese government. Whereas in the past, most Japanese cited 
ideology (socialism and Communism) as the reason for their dis-
like of China, increasingly they named the nature of the Chinese 
government—“absolutist (one-party monopoly on power)” and 
“hegemonic”—as the reason. In the August 2013 poll following the 
September 2012 incident with China over the Senkaku Islands, the 
number of Japanese with negative opinions of China rose to more 
than 90 percent for the ﬁrst time, with the island dispute listed as 
the main reason.
In the 1990s, Japanese policymakers became aware that a rising China 
was complicating Japan’s economic, diplomatic, and security choices. 
The desire for postwar reconciliation was proving diﬃcult, and the 
limits of high-level summitry to change popular attitudes were 
becoming visible. Beijing and Tokyo agreed, however, to seek a new 
vision for the relationship. For Japanese policymakers, the desire was 
to ﬁnd a vision that focused less on apologizing for the past and more 
on achieving reciprocity and mutual beneﬁt in the future.
The failure to win diplomatic cooperation from China took its 
toll at home, with the changing perceptions of China’s intent—and 
Japan’s vulnerability—inﬂuencing a range of domestic actors and 
advocates. Indeed, the political rhetoric of government critics, and 
sometimes of government oﬃcials themselves, seemed to be shifting 




After being out of power for three years, Japan’s conservative Lib-
eral Democratic Party (LDP) returned to govern at the end of 2012, 
and controversy over its attachment to the imperial Yasukuni Shrine 
returned as well. Abe Shinzō, Japan’s prime minister and a well-
known supporter of the shrine, did not hesitate to state publicly his 
regrets for not visiting it during his ﬁrst term in oﬃce. Then in April 
2013, his deputy prime minister, Asō Tarō, also a former prime min-
ister, became the ﬁrst high-level member of the Abe cabinet to pay 
homage to Japan’s imperial veterans, immediately drawing criticism 
from Beijing and Seoul. In protest, South Korea’s foreign minister, 
Yun Byung-se, canceled his imminent visit to Tokyo.
Tensions with China and Korea grew again over the summer as 
Japan’s commemoration of the end of World War II approached. 
Many in Japan worried aloud that their prime minister would go to 
the shrine, and diplomats across the region as well as from Wash-
ington quietly warned Abe to consider the damage this would do to 
Japan and regional stability. Abe consequently chose not to go but 
sent an aide to make an oﬀering on his behalf. Three members of 
the Abe cabinet, however, did visit Yasukuni on August 15, the sixty-
eighth anniversary of Japan’s surrender. Afterward, one of them told 
journalists that “foreign countries” should not interfere in what was 
essentially a domestic matter. On August 15, 102 members of Japan’s 
